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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an attempt to construct an 
alternative tradition of New Zealand and South African 
rugby football contacts to 1950. It examines the wider 
social conditions of such contacts, unlike the existing 
plethora of rugby-centred chronicles of matches, tours, 
and sporting personalities. Rugby tours between New 
Zealand and South Africa before 1950 raised questions 
over the relationship between sport, race and 
imperialism. The manner that rugby reflected the 
divergent racial traditions in both societies thus 
challenges the cliche that sport is separate from wider 
social and political considerations. 
The thesis consists of an introduction, conclusion 
and four chapters. The chapters correlate with the New 
Zealand and South African rugby exchanges of 1921, 1928, 
1937, and 1949. They are dominated by the themes of race 
relations and sporting imperialism, which form the 
context of the tours. Research is based on New Zealand 





Rugby football contacts between New Zealand and 
South Africa during the twentieth century has produced 
conflicting analysis from New Zealand society. To some, 
New Zealand and South African rugby tours were a 
traditional sporting rivalry that usually determined the 
leading international rugby power. By this account, test 
matches and series between the two countries have become 
part of rugby folklore. Increasingly however, New Zealand 
and South African rugby relations came to be seen not so 
much in sporting terms as in political and racial ones. 
New Zealanders, somewhat reluctantly according to some, 
became more aware that South African rugby was a 
microcosm of its wider society. Like all aspects of South 
African society, rugby was segregated along white-
constructed divisions of 'race', referred to commonly as 
'apartheid'. 1 The centrality of rugby to New Zealand male 
society - both Maori and 'Pakeha' (New Zealanders of 
European descent) - led New Zealand to lag behind the 
rest of the world in recognising South Africa's status as 
an international sporting and cultural pariah. 
1 Apartheid is an extreme form of legal, political 
and social discrimination imposed by white South Africa 
onto the majority 'black' {African, Indian and mixed or 
'Coloured' lineage) population. 
2 
The tension between race, politics and sport in 
relation to New Zealand and South African rugby was at 
its greatest during the 1981 Springbok tour of New 
Zealand. The turmoil of the 1981 tour divided New Zealand 
society sharply. 'Pro-tour' supporters viewed rugby 
between New Zealand and South Africa as a traditional 
sporting occasion. They believed in the separation of 
sport and politics, and considered apartheid as a purely 
South African (and thus separate) issue. 'Anti-tour' 
supporters, in contrast, saw sporting contacts with South 
r 
Africa within the context of human rights and apartheid. 
Such contacts, they believed, represented support for 
apartheid sport and society, and undermined a worldwide 
sporting and cultural boycott of South Africa. 
New Zealand opposition to sporting contacts with 
South Africa on the basis of apartheid had increased 
rapidly during the mid-1960s. Hitherto, New Zealand and 
South African rugby tours aroused minimal criticism. 
Furthermore, such criticism was based on the relatively 
narrow issue of Maori sporting rights in South Africa. 
Maori rugby players were excluded from the 1928, 1949 and 
1960 All Black teams that toured South Africa by the New 
Zealand Rugby Football Union (NZRFU). From a strictly 
rugby perspective, Maori exclusion from the 1928 and 1949 
tours in particular, ensured that several outstanding All 
Blacks never played against South Africa. The 1928 All 
Blacks toured without George Nepia (one of the all-time 
'greats' of New Zealand rugby) and Jimmy Mill. 
3 
Furthermore, Vince Bevan, Johnny Smith, Peter Smith and 
Ben couch were excluded from the 1949 All Blacks. In 
addition to Maori rugby players, a pre-Great War All 
Black of Anglo/West Indian lineage, 'Ranji' Wilson, was 
excluded from the 1919 New Zealand Imperial Services 
rugby tour of South Africa. 
The exclusion of Nepia and other Maori All Blacks 
was felt immediately on the playing field. The 1928 and 
1949 All Blacks drew and lost their respective test match 
series against the Springboks. Maori exclusion from rugby 
tours of South Africa was also a blatant discrepancy in 
relation to the context of New Zealand race relations. 
New Zealand, through the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi, 
enshrined the equal citizenship of Maori and Pakeha. 
While the Treaty failed to guarantee social and economic 
parity for Maori, 'equality' between Maori and Pakeha was 
part of the generally proclaimed egalitarian ethos. 
The degree to which Maori involved themselves in the 
rugby world was held, in some quarters, to be a mark of 
their assimilation of English customs. Rugby was not 
cricket but it was nonetheless part of the panoply of 
English games which were held to instil appropriate forms 
of social behaviour. At the same time, the high level of 
success on the rugby field by Maori players was commonly 
taken as an indicator of the wider European society's 
success in carrying Maori with them to egalitarian 
heights. This tension between egalitarian and 
assimilationist tendencies runs through the history of 
4 
New Zealand and South African rugby relations. 
The exclusion of Maori players from the 1928 and 
1949 tours of South Africa was opposed by a vocal 
minority of New Zealanders. The majority of rugby 
followers, on the other hand, accepted that the 1928 and 
1949 teams had to conform to South African social 
customs. Critics of Maori exclusion, nevertheless, 
remained limited in number until the late 1950s. 
Opponents of the 1960 'All White' All Black tour of South 
Africa organised protest meetings, petitions, leaflet 
distribution and public demonstrations. 2 The 1960 tour 
was the last in which Maori were excluded. Subsequent All 
Black tours of South Africa, such as those of 1970, 1976 
and 1992, included players of Maori and Pacific Island 
lineage. 
Whereas Maori sporting rights attracted growing 
debate before 1950, New Zealand and South African rugby 
contacts were often interpreted by middle class New 
Zealand commentators within an imperialist context. 
Newspaper editors, rugby officials and conservative 
politicians regarded such tours as occasions which 
emphasised the British cultural heritage of New Zealand 
and South Africa. The tours also formed part of an 
imperial sporting network consisting of Britain and the 
2 R. Thompson, Retreat From Apartheid, 1975, pp. 22-
24. 
5 
'white Dominions' (Australia, New Zealand, South 
Africa) . 3 The sporting empire was itself the product 
initially of British tours of the Dominions, and 
reciprocal Dominion tours of the 'old country'. The 
commencement of imperial sporting tours involving Britain 
raised the prospect of similar contacts between the 
Dominions. 4 Yet, in comparison to cricket, rugby failed 
to construct a sporting network which was independent of 
Britain until the 1921 Springbok tour of New Zealand. 5 
The prospect of rugby relations between New Zealand 
and South Africa raised the question of racial 
controversy within sport and wider society. New Zealand 
and south African sport and society were distinguished by 
their divergent views on their respective indigenous 
populations. Inclusion was the cornerstone of New Zealand 
sport, especially rugby. From the late nineteenth 
century, Maori and Pakeha often played alongside and 
3 B. Stoddart, "Sport, Cultural Imperialism, and 
Colonial Response in the British Empire", Society for 
Comparative study of Society and History, 1988, pp. 650, 
654; K. Sandiford, Cricket and the Victorians, 1994, pp. 
144-147. 
4 R. Archer and A. Bouillon, The South African Game, 
1982, p. 81. The South African cricket team made three 
tours of England before 1910, while England toured South 
Africa in 1905-06. The Australian cricket team toured 
South Africa in 1902-03, and South Africa reciprocated by 
touring Australia in 1910-11. 
5 New Zealand Rugby Football Union Management 
Committee Minutes, 11 November 1911; Referee, 26 November 
1913. The NZRFU made several attempts to arrange rugby 
contacts with South Africa before 1914. It was 
unsuccessful in obtaining Springbok tours during 1912 and 
1914. A 1915 Springbok tour of New Zealand in 1915 was 
considered by the South African Rugby Board (SARB), but 
came to nothing with the beginning of the Great War. 
6 
against each other. Maori players also featured at all 
levels of rugby, from secondary school to international 
level. 6 The first New Zealand team that toured Britain, 
the 1888 'Natives', included 21 players who were Maori or 
part-Maori. 7 Furthermore, Maori players such as Tom 
Ellison captained New Zealand teams following the 
beginning of 'official' (NZRFU-sanctioned) tours. 8 
South African sport and society, unlike New Zealand, 
was underpinned by racial segregation and exclusion. The 
black {African, 'Coloured' and Indian) majority was 
denied economic, political, and social opportunity by the 
ruling white minority. They participated in British team 
sports such as rugby, 9 although never alongside whites 
(until the late twentieth century). Black sportspeople 
initially saw white sports, especially cricket and rugby, 
as a means of entry into white society. 10 African and 
'Coloured' rugby administrations were established between 
6 G. Ryan, 'The Originals': The 1888-89 New Zealand 
Native Football Team in Britain, Australia, and New 
Zealand, 1992, p. 6; R. Chester and N. McMillan, The 
Encyclopedia of New Zealand Rugby, 1981, p. 347. 
7 Ryan, p. 7. 
8 Chester and McMillan, Encyclopedia, pp. 67, 186-
187, 347. 
9 A. Odendaal, "South Africa's Black Victorians", in 
J. Mangan (Ed), Pleasure, Profit, Proselytism, 1988, pp. 
199-200. A 'Coloured' cricketer, Krom Hendricks, was 
selected, but subsequently ommitted from the 1894 South 
African cricket tour of England. 
w Odendaal, pp. 199-200. 
7 
1890 and 1910 . 11 The emergence of black South African 
rugby, however, had little impact on the racial 
composition of Springbok teams. Such teams remained 
exclusively white and represented the 'official' South 
African Rugby Board (SARB). 
The opposing racial traditions of New Zealand and 
South Africa was alluded to, at times, by sporting 
', 
commentators as rugby contacts between the two countries 
developed. It was the basis for the NZRFU's exclusion of 
Maori players from the 1928 and 1949 All Black tours of 
South Africa. Furthermore, it sparked the prospect of 
cultural controversy during the 1921 and 1937 Springbok 
tours of New Zealand. The 1921 tour produced a major 
cultural incident through the 'Blackett cablegram' , which 
objected to contact between Springbok and Maori players. 
A proposed Maori boycott of the 1937 tour was averted by 
guarantees from the SARB that they would treat Maori as 
equals. 
The negation of Maori sporting rights enabled the 
continuation of rugby relations between New Zealand and 
South Africa. Yet, sporting commentators initially 
observed such relations as imperialist events. The 1921 
Springbok tour, in particular, was hailed as an occasion 
which emphasised Empire solidarity. The South African 
players were welcomed in a manner similar to royalty. 
11 Archer and Bouillon, pp. 58-59; Odendaal, p. 199. 
The South African Colonial Rugby Football Board was 
established in 1896, and was dominated by 'Coloured' 
teams. In addition, the Eastern Province 'Native' 
(African) Rugby Board was formed in 1905. 
8 
Subsequent tours failed to generate the overt imperialism 
of 1921, although the sporting imperative prevailed. They 
were seen by New Zealanders and South Africans alike as 
determining world rugby supremacy. The tours increasingly 
came to be described in internationalist and sporting 
terms, rather than imperialist ones. Hence, rugby was 
promoted as a means of building 'friendships' and 
increasing 'mutual knowledge' among all peoples. 
\ 
Rugby tours involving South Africa, at times, served 
a wider political objective. South African commentators, 
on occasions, alluded to rugby as a means of achieving 
unity between the 'races'. Their concept of 'race' was 
restricted to Anglo and Afrikaner South Africans, and 
excluded black South Africans. Anglos and Afrikaners 
played alongside each other in South African teams before 
the Boer Republics (Transvaal, Orange Free State) and 
British colonies (Cape, Natal) were unified by the 1910 
Act of Union. 12 Moreover, imperial politics shaped the 
views of those who supported sporting contacts with South 
Africa. Between 1902 (the conclusion of the Anglo-Boer 
War) and 1914, South Africa enjoyed regular rugby and 
cricket tours with Britain and Australia. Moreover, they 
generally coincided with, or followed South African 
political milestones such as the 1902 Treaty of 
12 c. Greyvenstein, Springbok Saga: A Pictorial 
History from 1891, 1981, p. 39. The notion of Anglo-
Afrikaner 'conciliation' was visible during the first 
(1906-07) Springbok tour of Britain. The team's captain, 
Paul Roos spoke of the players as 'a band of happy South 
Africans', rather than Anglos or Afrikaners. 
9 
Vereeniging and 1910 Act of Union. 0 
The inherent amateurism of South African rugby 
players prompted much discussion from sporting 
commentators. Their social background resembled closely 
that of their English, Irish and Scottish rugby 
counterparts. The typical Springbok player came from a 
middle class background, had a private school (and often 
a university) education. Afrikaner Springboks, in 
particular, were often graduates of the University of 
Stellenbosch. And it is notable that Afrikaner society 
prized amateurism as much as did the English middle 
classes. The Afrikaner held, as Archer and Bouillon point 
out, an aversion to 'all that was capitalist';w money 
would turn play into work and diminish its ideological 
purpose. 
The middle class and amateur context of South 
African rugby ensured that it was more congenial to the 
British than was New Zealand rugby. The Springboks were 
invited to tour Britain twice before 1914 (1906-07, 1912-
13), whereas the All Blacks toured only in 1905-06. It 
remains plausible that South African rugby was rewarded 
for its apparent amateurism and social elitism. The New 
Zealand game, on the other hand, was suspected of 
encouraging professionalism. New Zealand teams, 
especially the 1905-06 All Blacks, faced such 
13 See Archer and Bouillon, p. 81. 
14 ibid. ' p. 7 2. 
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allegations. They seemed to play to win 'at all costs'.u 
The players' social origins was also more egalitarian 
than their British and South African rivals. Their 
background resembled that of rugby players from Wales and 
the professional Northern Union (Rugby League). The 
apparent similarity, furthermore, was not lost upon the 
British. 
The investment of imperialist status into rugby 
contacts between Britain, South Africa and New Zealand, 
was subsequently extended to the British Empire Games. A 
greater number of countries and colonies took part in the 
Empire Games than rugby and cricket tours. The Games' 
commencement in 1930 also drew the question of South 
African attitudes to race even more widely into the 
sporting arena. Before the 1930s, little discussion over 
South African sporting segregation had taken place. 
However, Empire Games teams from African, West Indian and 
Asian colonies would be prevented from competing in South 
Africa due to segregation. Racial controversy was, 
nonetheless, avoided when the 1934 Empire Games was taken 
away from Johannesburg. 
The growing Afrikaner role in rugby was to introduce 
into South African rugby politics a form of nationalism 
15 B. Dobbs, Edwardians at Play: Sport 1890-1914, 
1973, pp. 110-111, 115. New Zealand teams employed a 
seven player (2-3-2) scrum and 'wing forward' position, 
instead of the customary eight player scrum. The wing 
forward was seen by British commentators as illegal and 
contrary to the 'amateur spirit' of rugby. The 1906-07 
and 1912-13 Springbok teams.did not play a wing forward, 
and packed an eight player (3-3-2) scrum. 
11 
which was diametrically opposed to the imperialism that 
had launched the game. Whereas emergent New Zealand 
nationalism was to some degree expressed in terms of a 
continuing British connection, Afrikaner nationalism was 
imbued with an element of anti-British thought. South 
African test and touring teams invariably included 
Afrikaner players (often Stellenbosch University 
graduates or Stellenbosch club players). They initially 
reflected the ethnic divisions of white South Africa 
(Afrikaners outnumbered Anglos by approximately two to 
one). Afrikaner representation in the Springboks 
increased steadily following the Great War, and 
Afrikaners were usually chosen as Springbok captains. The 
greater number of Afrikaner Springboks also coincided 
with the rise of Afrikaner nationalism as a dominant 
political force. Consequently, rugby contacts with New 
Zealand, according to some, became a sporting re-
enactment of the Anglo-Boer War. 
The unfolding of rugby tours between New Zealand and 
South Africa raised wider questions relating to New 
Zealand race relations. The tours ensured that 
inclusionist (New Zealand) and segregationist ( South 
Africa) cultures, reflected through their rugby teams, 
would clash. Notwithstanding the Blackett cablegram, 
Springbok touring teams generally respected the 
inclusionist tradition of New Zealand society. All Black 
teams also respected South African social customs, and 
usually overlooked the clear inequalities between black 
12 
and white South Africans. The reaction of New Zealand 
commentators to the racial beliefs of white South Africa, 
however, was tinged with social darwinist overtones. 
Maori and Pakeha spokespeople accepted the notion that 
some races were innately superior to others. They were 
abhorred when South Africans expressed discriminatory 
views against Maori. Their indignation, however, 
overlooked segregation against black South Africans. To 
some New Zealanders - Maori and Pakeha - black South 
Africans stood somewhere below the level of the Maori. 
An analysis of rugby contacts between New Zealand 
and South Africa to 1950 demonstrates that they were more 
than simply sporting occasions. They revealed the manner 
in which rugby as a sport was invested with quite 
different attitudes and assumptions in New Zealand and 
South Africa. Rugby tours between the two countries 
brought into focus wider political and racial questions. 
More often than not, New Zealand and South Africa 
diverged sharply over imperialist and racial questions. 
These differences were apparent during rugby tours 
between the two countries. Racial issues, in particular, 
came to dominate New Zealand and South African rugby 
contacts. New Zealand was required to surrender its 
inclusionist ethos in relation to race, to allow its 
sporting relationship with South Africa to develop. In 
comparison, South Africa maintained its segregationist 
ethos throughout its sporting relationship with New 
13 
Zealand until the early 1990s. 
CHAPl'ER ONE 
The 1921 Springbok Tour of New 
Zealand: 
'This was the most unfortunate match ever played.' 
(Charles Blackett) 
14 
Imperial and racial themes dominated the social 
context of the 1921 Springbok rugby tour of New Zealand. 
Middle class New Zealand commentators viewed the 1921 
tour as a major imperial sporting occasion between New 
Zealand and South Africa. However, the most infamous 
event of the tour was the publication of the 'Blackett 
cablegram', which described the Springbok-New Zealand 
Maori XV game as 'the most unfortunate match ever 
played'. It also claimed that the Springboks were 
'disgusted' at the sight of local spectator support for 
'a band of coloured men' . When the Blackett cablegram was 
leaked to the New Zealand press, eminent Maori and Pakeha 
spokespeople were incensed by the racist slur against the 
Maori XV. Hitherto, the Springboks were willing guests at 
several hui (Maori gatherings). The Springbok manager, 
Harold Bennett, was obliged to repudiate the involvement 
of his players and expose Blackett as the cablegram's 
author. The controversy, nonetheless, was to simmer for 
years to come. 
15 
Race relations had thus emerged as a central theme 
within New Zealand and South African sporting relations. 
During the previous decade, the NZRFU had rejected a 
proposal for a tour by a South African 'Coloured' 
('mixed' race) rugby team in 1911. The Rugby Union would 
only host teams affiliated with the white-only South 
African Rugby Board (SARB). 1 Furthermore, a former All 
Black, Ranji Wilson, was excluded from the 1919 New 
Zealand Imperial Services rugby tour of South Africa, due 
to his English-West Indian ancestry. 2 Wilson was viewed 
by white South Africans as a 'Coloured', and was unable 
to play alongside 'whites' according to the 
segregationist custom of South African sport and society. 
The possibility of New Zealand's rugby, military or 
government officials insisting on Ranji Wilson's 
involvement in the 1919 New Zealand Services' tour was 
not apparently considered. In later years, a member of 
the team, John 'Alex' Bruce, felt that the 1919 team had 
taken the 'soft option' by conforming to white South 
African social customs, and excluding Ranji Wilson from 
the tour. 3 He believed that a stand on the question of 
'Coloured' inclusion would have averted the humiliation 
of 'a fine man and sportsman'. 4 In addition, it would 
1 NZRFU Management Committee Minutes, 11 November 
1911. 
2 G. Slatter, On the Ball, 1970, p. 145. 
3 B. Luxford, Alex the Bruce, 1994, pp. 17-18. 
4 ibid. 
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perhaps enable the inclusion of Maori on subsequent rugby 
tours of South Africa. 5 Hitherto, Wilson and Bruce were 
loose forwards for Wellington and New Zealand before the 
Great War. Both players also played for the New Zealand 
Services team in Britain during 1919. 6 
Maori rugby players were not chosen to tour South 
Africa in 1919, as they (like Ranji Wilson) were 
considered by white South Africans to be 'Coloured'. 
Nonetheless, the itinerary for the 1921 Springbok tour of 
New Zealand included games against a New Zealand Maori XV 
and provincial teams which included Maori players. The 
Springboks also attended a number of hui. As the SARB did 
not object to the touring programme, New Zealand rugby 
administrators presumed that the Springboks would abide 
by the inclusionist tradition of New Zealand. Hence, the 
equal status of Maori and Pakeha as New Zealand citizens 
would be respected by the South Africans. 
The initial relationship between Maori and the 1921 
Springboks was free of racial tension, and was sustained 
until the game against the New Zealand Maori XV on 7 
September 1921. Within a formal and informal setting, the 
Springboks were received by North Island tribal 
confederations. At a Waitara {Taranaki) hui, press 
correspondents observed similarities between Maori and 
s ibid. 
6 A. c. Swan, History of New Zealand Rugby Football: 
Volume One 1870-1945, 1948, pp. 526, 529-530. 
17 
Afrikaners as conquered nations within the British 
Empire. 7 A Cabinet Minister, Dr. Maui Pomare, translated 
the Maori welcome into English, and Theo Pienaar did the 
same when the south Africans responded in Afrikaans. 8 
Similar greetings were offered by Hawke's Bay Maori to 
the Springboks at Hastings/ and within an informal 
context in the Bay of Plenty. A number of the players 
also planted some thirty trees at 'Springbok Point' 
overlooking Whakarewarewa (Rotorua), during a visit to a 
predominantly Maori school. 10 
The various hui and informal social occasions 
between the Springboks and Maori indicated that the South 
Africans apparently respected the inclusionist ideals of 
New Zealand. This received further emphasis during games 
against North Island provincial teams. Included in the 
1921 tour itinerary were matches against Bay of Plenty 
and a combined Hawke's Bay-Poverty Bay XV. Both 
provincial teams included several Maori players. 11 
Indisputably for the first time, the Springboks were 
opposed by players of darker skin colour. For the Hawke's 
Bay-Poverty Bay game, the referee was T. Parata, a 
7 Lyttelton Times, 16 September 1921. 
8 Press, 14 September 1921. 
9 Weekly Press and NZ Referee, 25 August 1921, 16 
September 1921. 
10 Press, 26 August 1921. 
11 Daily Telegraph, 6 September 1921. Nine members of 
the Maori XV had played against the Springboks for their 
provinces. 
18 
leading Maori rugby administrator. He was almost 
certainly the first 'non-white' rugby official to referee 
the Springboks. The teams, furthermore, were entertained 
by a Maori cultural party before the game. 12 
Relations between Springbok and Maori throughout the 
1921 tour suggested that the match of 7 September 1921 
against the New Zealand Maori XV would be no different to 
any other. Yet, before the game, several of the Springbok 
players allegedly turned their backs during a pre-game 
haka by a Maori cultural party . 13 The incident was 
overlooked by the sporting press, which presumed that 
nothing untoward had taken place. The Maori XV players 
did not publicly remark at the time that they were 
offended. Moreover, photographs of the haka which 
appeared in the otago Witness failed to indicate that the 
Springbok players had turned their backs.w 
It was only in the mid-to-late twentieth century, 
when New Zealand's rugby contacts with South Africa were 
opposed by many on racial grounds, that the Springbok 
back-turning incident was mentioned. The Maori XV winger, 
Jack Blake, remarked in later years that he and the rest 
of the team were 'seething with anger' at the actions of 
the Springboks. 15 The game itself was vigorous and, at 
12 otago Witness, 6 September 1921. 
13 R. Chester and N. McMillan, The Visitors, 1990, p. 
113. 
14 otago Witness, 20 September 1921. 
15 N. McMillan, "Duelling Giants", New Zealand Sports 
Monthly, July 1994, p. 22. 
19 
times, controversial. The Springboks claimed that the 
Maori XV' s scrummaging style was illegal . 16 Moreover, 
several of the Maori XV and sections of the Napier crowd 
objected to a Springbok try scored late in the game, 
which allowed them to defeat the Maori XV by 9-8 . 17 The 
Springbok victory was obtained arguably through a 
refereeing error. The Maori players, nonetheless, 
apparently accepted their defeat in sportsmanlike manner. 
The Springbok-Maori XV match immediately became an 
occasion of ignominy due to the publication of the 
Blackett cablegram. A South African newspaper 
correspondent, Charles Blackett, delivered his version of 
the game to the Napier Postal and Telegraph Department: 
This was the most unfortunate match ever played. 
Only result great pressure being brought to bear on 
[Harold] Bennett induced them to meet the Maoris, 
who had assisted largely in the entertainment of the 
Springboks. It was bad enough having to play a team 
officially designated 'New Zealand Natives', but the 
spectacle of thousands of Europeans frantically 
cheering on a band of coloured men to defeat members 
of their own race was too much for the Springboks, 
who were frankly disgusted. 
This was not the worst. The crowd was [the] most 
unsportsmanlike experienced on the tour, especially 
[a] section who lost all control of their 
feelings ... 18 
16 The Maori XV packed a seven player (2-3-2) scrum, 
which was a customary tactic of New Zealand rugby teams. 
However, the Springboks did not dispute its legitimacy 
before playing the Maori XV. 
17 Chester and McMillan, Visitors, pp. 113-114. The 
Springbok winger had allegedly stepped into touch before 
passing the ball to the tryscorer. 
18 Daily Telegraph, 9 September 1921. 
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An employee of the Postal and Telegraph Department, 
J. T. Evans, and two of his colleagues illegally typed a 
copy of the cablegram and forwarded it to the Napier 
Daily Telegraph . 19 
The public response to the Blackett cablegram was 
immediately one of outrage at the explicit slur against 
the Maori XV. Public criticism of the cablegram, however, 
reflected the social darwinist concept of 'superior' and 
'inferior' races. Maori and Pakeha spokespeople took 
issue with the cablegram's implication of racial parity 
between Maori and black South Africans. The equality of 
Maori and Pakeha was a common platitude of many New 
Zealanders - Pakeha in particular. On the other hand, 
black South Africans were viewed by New Zealand 
commentators - Maori and Pakeha - to be racially inferior 
to Maori. 
As Charles Blackett was not immediately named as the 
cablegram's author, New Zealand indignation was directed 
towards the Springbok players. The Christchurch Sun 
reported rumours that a number of the Springboks 
"strongly resented having to play the Maoris. 1120 'Pale 
Face', in the Daily Telegraph, accused the Springboks of 
hypocrisy. They had accepted Maori hospitality, but now 
appeared to think Maori rugby players were racially 
inferior. He added, threateningly, that the South 
Africans may suffer 'unsportsmanlike treatment' if they 
19 ibid. 
w sun, 13 September 1921. 
21 
persisted with such views.n 
The lion's share of local opposition to the Blackett 
cablegram condemned sporting and social segregation when 
it was applied to Maori, yet failed to rebuke its 
application to black South Africans. The Hawke' s Bay 
Rugby Union Executive, in a telegram to the Springbok 
manager, Harold Bennett, remarked that the Springbok 
players had spent enough time in New Zealand to be aware 
of its inclusionist tradition. Hence, they should not 
liken Maori to black South Africans.n The Christchurch 
Press, in an editorial, commented that it was absurd to 
place black South Africans 'on an equality' with Maori. 
It added, however, that white South Africans may have 
'good reasons' to practise segregation against 'Kaffirs 
and Zulus' . 23 
Publicised Maori protests against the Blackett 
cablegram were as social darwinist in nature as those of 
Pakeha. Nonetheless, they were confined publicly to the 
Arawa tribal confederation (Bay of Plenty} and the 
renowned doctor, Te Rangi Hiroa (Dr Peter Buck}. The 
Arawa and Te Rangi Hiroa protests, nonetheless, had great 
impact due to their status of 'respectability' within 
Pakeha society. The Arawa had supported British and 
colonial troops against 'rebel' Maori in the nineteenth 
21 Daily Telegraph, 10 September 1921. 
22 ibid. 
n Press, 15 September 1921. 
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century Anglo-Maori wars.~ Their loyalist reputation was 
enhanced at the beginning of the Great War, when they 
were among the first Maori to volunteer for military 
service. 25 The Arawa reacted to the Blackett cablegram by 
accusing the Springboks of ungentlemanly behaviour. They 
also regretted offering 'courtesy and hospitality' to the 
Springboks during their Rotorua visit. 26 
The most eloquent, yet explicitly social darwinist 
objection to the Blackett cablegram was advanced by Te 
Rangi Hiroa, the Director of Maori Hygiene. Te Rangi 
Hiroa was part of a Maori elite th'at favoured 
assimilation into Pakeha society as essential for the 
material rejuvenation of Maori.v As an otago University 
graduate {he was one of the first Maori medical 
students),~ and a former Liberal Party politician, Te 
Rangi Hiroa was the embodiment of cultural assimilation. 
He described the South African use of sporting 
segregation against Maori as 'bad taste and gross 
~ W. Gardiner, Te Mura O Te Ahi: The Story of the 
Maori Battalion, 1992, pp. 13, 23. 
2S ibid• I P • 13 • 
u Sun, 14 September 1921. 
v See M. King, 11 Between Two Worlds 11 , in G. Rice 
{Ed), The Oxford History of New Zealand, 1992, pp. 294-
295. Te Rangi Hiroa's peers included Apirana Ngata and 
Maui Pomare. All had attended Te Aute College, were 
university graduates, members of the 'Young Maori Party', 
and had served in Parliament. 
28 J. B. Condliffe, Te Rangi Hiroa: The Life of Sir 
Peter Buck, 1971, p. 76. 
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ignorance' . 29 He also believed that the Springboks should 
have been aware of the equal status between Maori and 
Pakeha. Their ignorance of New Zealand social traditions, 
according to Te Rangi Hiroa, stemmed from 'developing 
brawn and muscle' for sporting success, while neglecting 
their intellectual faculties.m 
Te Rangi Hiroa' s defence of Maori against South 
African racism, however, was based on an assumption of 
Maori racial 'superiority' over black South Africans. He 
explained that Maori were 'Caucasian' and not 'negroid', 
and were not conquered like 'menial' races. 31 Instead, 
through the Treaty of Waitangi, Maori enjoyed equal 
citizenship. 32 Accordingly, the alleged Springbok 
objection to playing the Maori XV was especially galling. 
Te Rangi Hiroa believed if the Springboks maintained 
their segregationist beliefs, they should not be invited 
back to New Zealand. He felt that this would protect 
Maori players, supporters and their 'friends' from 
further 'gratuitous insult' . 33 
The extent of local indignation against the Blackett 
cablegram prompted a public disavowal from the Springbok 
D Sun, 14 September 1921. 
30 ibid. 
31 ibid. 
32 See Condliffe, p. 173., for a similar racial 
distinction between Samoans and 'negroes' • After settling 
in Honolulu during 1930, Te Rangi Hiroa made it clear to 
a visiting United States Congressional Committee that 
'Samoans •.. were not negroes but Aryans'. 
n sun, 14 September 1921. 
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manager, Harold Bennett. In a considered public 
statement, Bennett pointed out that the cablegram was not 
published in the South African sporting press. He 
mentioned that 'a newspaper correspondent' (Blackett) had 
written the cablegram in the heat of the moment and 
regretted his action almost immediately.~ Bennett added 
that the Springboks were not involved in writing the 
cablegram, and denied that they were coerced into playing 
the Maori XV. 35 Yet, Charles Blackett, who admitted 
writing the cablegram, was 'astonished' that Bennett had 
apologised to the press. He was equally surprised that 
South African newspapers had not published the 
cablegram. 36 
The revelation from Harold Bennett that Charles 
Blackett was responsible for the cablegram was 
immediately accepted 
rapport between the 
by sporting commentators. 37 The 
Springboks and Maori before 7 
September 1921 was also referred to as proof that the 
South Africans were happy to play the Maori XV. 38 The 
Maori XV manager, 'Ned' Parata, denied that ill-feeling 
existed between the Springbok and Maori players. To 
emphasise the apparent amicability between South African 
and Maori, Parata mentioned that his son was the 
~ Daily Telegraph, 10 September 1921. 
35 ibid. 
36 New Zealand Herald, 16 September 1921. 
37 sun, 16 September 1921. 
38 Press, 15 September 1921. 
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Springbok mascot for several of their games. Furthermore, 
he was asked to do the same for the final (and deciding) 
match between the All Blacks and Springboks.B Following 
Parata's remarks, discussion surrounding the Blackett 
cablegram faded from the sporting press. 
The Springbok players were reminded of the 
inclusionist custom of New Zealand society by a prominent 
Reform Government Cabinet Minister, Gordon Coates, 
following the final test match. Coates, who was Minister 
of Native Affairs, remarked at a teams' dinner that Maori 
and Pakeha were 'one in this country' . 40 His comments, 
while alluding to the equal citizenship of Maori and 
Pakeha, could be viewed by some as a euphemism for Maori 
assimilation into Pakeha culture. 
Throughout the furore of the Blackett cablegram, 
limited debate surfaced over Maori sporting rights in 
relation to future New Zealand and South African rugby 
tours. Harold Bennett, in a conversation with T. Parata, 
dismissed the prospect of a Maori rugby tour of South 
Africa. He outlined the problems that Maori players would 
face under the colour line such as racially segregated 
hotels, restaurants, public transport, and impulsive 
racist abuse. 41 He also argued that Maori should not be 
included in future All Black teams to South Africa. 42 
B Sun, 16 September 1921. 
40 Lyttelton Times, 20 September 1921. 
41 Daily Telegraph, 10 September 1921. 
42 ibid. 
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Bennett's remarks would rekindle racial controversy in 
subsequent years, as Maori exclusion became the 
conventional practice of the NZRFU when selecting All 
Black teams to tour South Africa. 
Significant as the Blackett cablegram was (and 
racial issues would become), the 1921 tour took place 
within a wider political and social context of post-Great 
War imperialist sentiment. Middle class and 'better 
educated' New Zealanders, in particular, held an exalted 
opinion of the British Empire. 43 The 'good' citizen was 
seen primarily as a citizen of the Empire, and secondly 
one of New Zealand." Schoolteachers viewed 'patriotism' 
as synonymous to imperialism. 45 School curriculum and 
textbooks focused on British history and imperial 
military triumphs. 46 Moreover, state schools, from 1921, 
were compelled to 'salute the flag' (often the Union 
Jack) every week.~ 
Al though middle class commentators attempted to 
encourage imperialist hegemony within New Zealand 
43 K. Sinclair, A Destiny Apart: New Zealand's Search 
for National Identity, 1986, p. 108. 
"P. J. Gibbons, "The Climate of Opinion", in Rice 
(Ed), Oxford History of New Zealand, p. 326. 
45 K. Sinclair, A History of New Zealand, 1991, p. 
247. 
46 J. o. c. Phillips, A Man's Country? The Image of 
the Pakeha Male: A History, 1987, p. 193. The school 
textbook, The Story of the British Nation, was reprinted 
frequently during the 1920s. 
47 Sinclair, A Destiny Apart, p. 232. 
27 
society, conflicting attitudes towards Britain were, at 
times, expressed by working class commentators. However, 
the extent of anti-imperial sentiment remains difficult 
to quantify. The Labour Party, nevertheless, was often 
accused by its opponents of 'disloyalty to the Empire' 
for its opposition to military conscription.a Many New 
Zealanders, furthermore, had to compete against British 
immigrants for employment following the Great War. Their 
scornful reference to expatriate Britons as 'Hornies' 49 
was anything but Anglocentric. 
The customary view of middle class commentators 
towards the 1921 tour was that it symbolised healthy 
inter-imperial relations. Imperial co-operation between 
New Zealand and South Africa previously took place within 
a military context during the Great War. It was 
subsequently transferred from the battlefield to the 
playing field.~ According to sports administrators, 
conservative politicians and press editors, the 1921 tour 
was an opportunity to cement sporting and social contacts 
between two nations of the Empire. Without mentioning the 
British Empire specifically, the Christchurch Press, in 
an editorial, described sporting occasions such as New 
Zealand and South African rugby as a 'potent' factor that 
48 Sinclair, History of New Zealand, p. 243. 
49 Sinclair, A Destiny Apart, pp. 104-105, 108. 
50 B. Stoddart, "Sport, Culture, and Postcolonial 
Relations: A Preliminary Analysis of the Commonweal th 
Garnes", in G. Redmond (Ed.), Sport and Politics, 1986, p. 
126. 
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encouraged 'friendships' and 'mutual international 
knowledge' . 51 
Despite the constant imperialist platitudes from 
middle class commentators, the 1921 tour was a potential 
stimulus for New Zealand and South African sporting 
nationalism. It was the first major rugby tour for both 
countries without British participation.n For that 
reason, New Zealand and South Africa, by playing against 
each other, displayed symbolic independence from 'home'. 
Yet, the wider nationalist significance of the tour was 
either overlooked totally by sporting commentators, or 
alluded to within an imperial setting. 
The 1921 tour, from a South African perspective, 
continued the theme of 'conciliation' between Afrikaner 
and Anglo South Africans. This was previously manifested 
through rugby contacts between South Africa and Britain 
before the Great War. Afrikaners were commonly selected 
for South African teams against Britain, and the captain 
of the first (1906-07) Springboks to Britain was an 
Afrikaner, Paul Roos. 53 Following the Great War, the 
ethnic mix of Springbok touring teams indicated the 
extent of Afrikaner domination of South African rugby. 
Team selections often mirrored the two-thirds to one-
51 Press, 13 July 1921. 
n See Swan, pp. 287-297. Previously, New Zealand had 
toured Australia on numerous occasions, and North America 
in 1913. 
53 I. D. Difford, History of South African Rugby 
Football (1875-1932), 1933, passim. Anglos captained the 
1891, 1896, 1903 and 1910 South African rugby teams. 
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third split between Afrikaners and Anglos in the white 
South African population.~ The Afrikaner predominance in 
Springbok teams also extended to the Springbok captaincy 
throughout New Zealand and South African rugby contacts 
before (and after) 1950. Theo Pienaar (1921), Phil 
Mostert ( 1928) , Phil Nel ( 1937) and Felix du Plessis 
(1949) were the Springbok captains against their 
respective New Zealand opponents. 
The Afrikaner domination of Springbok rugby was 
maintained by the selection of the 1921 team. Little 
difference existed in its composition with that of the 
1906-07 and 1912-13 Springbok teams to Britain. That 
approximately two-thirds of the 1921 Springboks were 
Afrikaners was the basis of jounalistic exaggeration 
before their arrival in New Zealand. The players were 
erroneously described in the sporting press as 'Dutch-
Boer' giants with blond hair and blue eyes. However, a 
team photograph indicated that only one player, J. s. 
Olivier, had obviously blond hair. 55 
The 'blond Dutch giant' image of the South Africans 
vanished immediately following their New Zealand arrival. 
Consequently, the players received frequent imperialist 
praise from New Zealand political and sporting elites. 
Most spoke fervently of the pre-eminence of South 
Africans and New Zealanders among the people of the 
~ D. Woods, Black and White, 1981, pp. 44-46. 
55 Chester and McMillan, Visitors, p. 103; Difford, 
pp. 380-381. 
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Empire, and paid homage to the players as role-models of 
South African and Empire masculinity. At a Christchurch 
civic function, the rhetoric of the Mayor, Dr Henry 
Thacker {President of the Canterbury Rugby League), 
transcended sport and focused on imperial politics. He 
mentioned that the South African Prime Minister, Jan 
Smuts, and his predecessor, Louis Botha, were admired 
greatly by New Zealanders. 56 Previously, Smuts and Botha 
were leading proponents of Anglo-Afrikaner conciliation 
following the 1899-1902 Anglo-Boer War. 57 Smuts 
consequently became a leading figure in imperial 
politics, based on his service in the Imperial War 
Cabinet during the Great War. 
The role of South Africa in imperial politics was 
emphasised further by Frederick Wilding, a renowned 
Canterbury sports administrator.~ He was also father of 
Anthony Wilding, winner of four singles titles at the 
Wimbledon tennis tournament before 1914. Speaking after 
Thacker, Wilding proclaimed that South Africa, despite 
earlier differences with the British Empire, "had taken 
John Bull by the hand, and gone into partnership with his 
56 Press, 26 July 1921. 
57 L. Thompson, "The Compromise of Union", in M. 
Wilson and L. Thompson (Eds), The Oxford History of South 
Africa: Volume Two 1870-1966, 1971, pp. 339, 342-343, 
347-349. 
58 The Dictionary of New Zealand Biography. Volume 
Two. 1870-1900, 1993, pp. 576-577. Before emigrating to 
New Zealand, Frederick Wilding was a renowned rugby 
player in the West of England. Subsequently, he served as 
president of the New Zealand Cricket Council, and 
president of the Canterbury Cricket Association. 
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offspring."~ His verbosity alluded to imperial sporting 
and military links, and almost certainly reflected the 
quintessential middle class perspective of imperialism. 
The sanctimonious imperialist platitudes employed by 
middle class commentators, such as Wilding, to portray 
the Springboks and South Africa was echoed by New 
Zealand's political elite. The Acting Prime Minister Sir 
Francis Dillon Bell,ro remarked at a Government function 
that the 1921 tour attracted the interest of the 
Government and 'people of the Dominion', as the players 
were 'missionaries'. 61 Despite the ambiguous 
characterisation employed by Bell, the Springboks were 
perceived as 'missionaries of Empire' in much the same 
way as the 1905 All Blacks to Britain had been. They were 
also missionaries of rugby, although the spectator 
numbers at the provincial games indicate that they were 
preaching to the converted. The Springbok-Wellington game 
attracted 30,000 spectators, while the first three games 
of the tour drew 33,000 people. 62 
The imperialist portray! of the Springboks by middle 
class commentators, on occasions, was similar to that of 
British royalty and returning soldiers. The analogy with 
59 Lyttelton Times, 26 July 1921. 
ro DNZB. Volume Two, pp. 35-36. During 1921, Sir 
Francis Dillon Bell was president of the Wellington 
Cricket Association. 
61 Press, 23 July 1921. 
62 Chester and McMillan, Visitors, pp. 103-105. 
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royalty was referred to by Harold Bennett at a Nelson 
function.~ Moreover, the South Africans (following the 
Wanganui game), were greeted at railway stations between 
Wanganui and New Plymouth in similar fashion to royalty 
ahd soldiers. Consequently, Bennett remarked at a New 
Plymouth function, attended by civic leaders and NZRFU 
administrators, that his players were 'overwhelmed' by 
New Zealand hospitality.M However, the public response 
to the Springboks' presence was due undoubtedly to 
sporting factors. The sporting public was starved of 
international rugby, as the 1921 tour was the first major 
sporting event in New Zealand since the 1908 Anglo-Welsh 
tour. 
The 1921 Springbok rugby tour of New Zealand took 
place within a social context of middle class imperial 
celebration, stemming from the aftermath of the Great 
War. Middle class commentators such as educators, sports 
officials and press editors repeatedly proclaimed the 
imperialist relevance of sporting events. Thus, the 1921 
tour, from a middle class outlook, represented an 
emphatic endorsement of imperial sporting relations. The 
Springboks were portrayed as 'a fine sporting lot' who 
played 'manly' rugby and behaved as 'gentlemen'. 65 
Moreover, as elite sportsmen from an associate Dominion 
63 Press, 12 September 1921. 
M Press, 15 July 1921. 
65 Press, 19 September 1921. 
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within the British Empire, they were compared favourably 
with royalty and war heroes. The tour also promoted New 
Zealand and South African sporting nationalism. The 
sporting press, however, overlooked the nationalist 
significance of the first major rugby tour for New 
Zealand and South Africa without British involvement. 
The 1921 tour generated constant imperialist 
laurels, yet the publication of the Blackett cablegram 
undoubtedly tarnished their public image. Through the 
cablegram and its attack against the New Zealand Maori 
XV, New Zealanders became increasingly aware of South 
African sporting and social segregation. Local 
denunciation of the cablegram, while condemning explicit 
racism against Maori, did nothing to question its 
practice against black south Africans. The belief that 
Maori were racially 'equal' to Pakeha and 'superior' to 
black South Africans, was shared by many Pakeha and Maori 
spokespeople such as Te Rangi Hiroa. 
The inclusionist ethos of New Zealand rugby was yet 
to be officially tested under South African social 
conditions. During the 1921 tour, Harold Bennett's 
recommendation that Maori rugby players should be 
excluded from South Africa received limited newspaper 
debate. Hence, uncertainty remained whether All Black 
teams to South Africa would include Maori and other New 
Zealanders of darker skin colour. If Maori were permitted 
to tour, what would their social status be within South 
Africa? If they were excluded, would the NZRFU maintain 
34 
sporting relations contacts with South Africa? Needless 
to say, such questions would require answers before the 
resumption of rugby contacts between New Zealand and 
South Africa. 
CHAPTER TWO 
The 1928 All Black Tour of South 
Africa: 
35 
'This decision is a slur on the dignity and manhood of 
Maori.' (Akarana Maori Association) 
The exclusion of Maori rugby players was the most 
dominant aspect of the 1928 All Black rugby tour of South 
Africa. Maori exclusion observed the precedent set by the 
1919 New Zealand Imperial Services rugby team of 
excluding players of darker skin colour from South 
Africa. The prospect of Maori inclusion in the 1928 All 
Blacks, however, was always remote. The controversy of 
the 1921 Blackett cablegram, if it did little else, 
affirmed the opinion that South African rugby would not 
welcome Maori players. During the 1921 Springbok tour, 
Harold Bennett, the Springbok manager, remarked publicly 
that he would recommend Maori exclusion from teams 
visiting South Africa. Despite the negation of Maori 
sporting rights, middle class New Zealand commentators 
continued to view rugby contacts with South Africa from 
an imperialist viewpoint. Their rhetoric, however, was 
less pious than that of 1921. In contrast, the sporting 
Empire provoked a mixed reaction from South African 
commentators during the 1928 tour. Anglo South Africans, 
at times, saw the tour as part of the imperial sporting 
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network. Many Afrikaners, however, rejected the 
imperialist depiction of South African rugby. As 
Afrikaner players dominated Springbok teams, Afrikaner 
commentators viewed rugby increasingly within an 
'Afrikaner nationalist' context. 
Maori exclusion from the 1928 tour directly 
contradicted the inclusionist tradition of New Zealand 
sport and society, based on the equal citizenship of 
Maori and Pakeha. Within wider society, however, the 
status of Maori in relation to Pakeha remained unequal. 
Throughout the 1920s, the Reform Government attempted to 
narrow the social and economic gap between Maori and 
Pakeha. 1 Its efforts were hindered by the continued 
appropriation of Maori land. 2 By 1929, the loss of Maori 
land had reached an average annual rate of 29,091 
hectares. 3 Only 1.6 million hectares of land (out of 26 
1 M. King, "Between Two Worlds", pp. 288-289, 297; 
R. Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou: Struggle Without End, 
1990, p. 186. Reform encouraged Maori advancement through 
assimilationist means. Its education policy sought to 
establish Maori as 'good farmers' and 'good farmer's 
wives'. 
2 J. Kelsey, "Legal Imperialism and the Colonisation 
of Aotearoa", in P. Spoonley, c. Macpherson, D. Pearson, 
and c. Sedgwick (Eds), Tauiwi: Racism and Ethnicity in 
New Zealand, 1984, p. 35; H. Yensen, "It went so well, so 
what went wrong?" , in H. Yens en, K. Hague, and T. 
McCreanor (Eds), Honouring The Treaty, 1989, p. 65. The 
Government, through the 1928 Public Works Act, was able 
to confiscate Maori land for forestry, recreation, 
reading, subdivision and 'better utilization'. 
3 M. King, Maori: A Photographic and Social History, 
1983, p. 200; Walker, p. 187. 
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million) was Maori-owned. 4 Hence, the only realm of 
tangible equality between Maori and Pakeha remained the 
sporting field. Maori players were frequently chosen for 
New Zealand teams, although they failed to win selection 
for the All Blacks against the 1921 Springboks. 5 
The dominance of Maori players in New Zealand rugby 
was never more apparent than during the unbeaten 1924-25 
All Black tour of the British Isles. 6 The 'Invincibles' 
tour produced the first genuine hero of New Zealand 
rugby, George Nepia, who played every game and developed 
a legendary playing reputation. Nepia's sporting mastery 
and youth (he was twenty years of age in 1924) assured 
him of a lengthy rugby career. Yet, his emergence raised 
the question of Maori sporting rights in South Africa. In 
subsequent years, Nepia claimed that he was enthusiastic 
at the prospect of touring South Africa as an All Black. 
His hopes were dashed before the Invincibles' return to 
New Zealand by rugby officials, who informed him that 
Maori players would be ineligible. 7 Moreover, Nepia 
remarked in 1963 (three years after Maori exclusion from 
the 1960 All Black tour of South Africa) that both he and 
4 Kelsey, p. 35. 
5 For 1921 All Black test teams, see Swan, History 
of New Zealand Rugby Football: Volume One, pp. 357-358, 
360. 
6 ibid., p. 302. The 1924-25 'Invincibles' included 
three Maori backline players from the Hawke's Bay 
Ranfurly Shield team - George Nepia, Jimmy Mill and Lui 
Paewai. 
7 T. Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game, 1975, p. 22. 
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Jimmy Mill were 'strong candidates' for the 1928 tour of 
South Africa. At the last moment, he claimed, the NZRFU 
decided to rule Maori ineligible for selection. 8 Nepia's 
version of events is impossible to verify one way or the 
other, 9 but whatever the truth of the matter there were 
no Maori chosen for the proposed 1928 tour of South 
Africa. 
The eligibility of Maori players was overlooked at 
the 1925 NZRFU AGM, when the Rugby Union's Management 
Committee10 (Executive) scheduled the All Blacks to tour 
South Africa in 1928. At the same meeting, a tour of 
Britain and France was proposed for the New Zealand Maori 
rugby team in 19 2 6 . 11 Al though the Rugby Union did not 
admit it at the time, the 1926 Maori tour (and subsequent 
Maori rugby tours) had the effect of recompensing Maori 
players for missing out on All Black teams to South 
Africa. It may also be no mere coincidence that the NZRFU 
introduced the Prince of Wales Cup competition between 
regional Maori teams. Brought to New Zealand from the 
8 G. Nepia and T. McLean, I, George Nepia, 1963, p. 
153. 
9 See M. Romanos, "Nepia was the supreme NZ whizz-
kid", Tu Tangata, Issue 27, December 1985, pp. 34-36. It 
should be mentioned that George Nepia was known for his 
use of 'poetic licence' when recalling his playing 
career. He claimed, for instance, that he was sixteen 
years of age upon selection for the 1924-25 All Blacks. 
10 See T. McLean, New Zealand Rugby Legends, 1987, p. 
113. Between 1894 and 1937, the NZRFU was administered by 
its Management Committee. The Committee consisted of 
seven delegates and, from 1922, a non-voting Maori 
Advisory Board member. 
11 Press, 1 May 1925. 
39 
1926 Imperial Conference by the Prime Minister, Gordon 
Coates, the trophy was first awarded to Tai Rawhiti 
(Eastern) and was contested from 1928,u during the All 
Black tour of South Africa. 
Maori exclusion from the 1928 tour generated little, 
if any debate from the sporting press. On the other hand, 
sporting commentators simply emphasised the playing 
prospects of the All Blacks. As early as July 1926, the 
Napier Daily Telegraph predicted a 'Fullback problem' for 
the 1928 All Blacks through the absence of George 
Nepia.ll Coinciding with the 1927 All Black trials, the 
sporting press believed that the fullback and halfback 
positons (the respective playing positions of Nepia and 
Jimmy Mill) were a selectorial nightmare . 14 The players 
on show at the trials were apparently not up to the 
calibre of Nepia and Mill. A columnist for the Daily 
Telegraph, 'Scrum', commented on 'new men' required to 
replace Nepia and Mill. He added that the two players 
were 'retired' . 15 Nepia and Mill, however, were still 
playing at provincial level. They subsequently played for 
the All Blacks against the 1930 British Isles team. 16 
12 Press, 28 September 1927. Tai Tokerau (Northern) , 
Tai Hauauru (Western), Tai Rawhiti (Eastern) and Te 
Waipounamu (Southern including the South Island) 
contested the Prince of Wales Cup. 
13 Daily Telegraph, 24 July 1926. 
14 New Zealand Truth, 29 September 1927. 
15 Daily Telegraph, 1 October 1927. 
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Rugby administrators and the New Zealand sporting 
public were not initially drawn into the debate over 
Maori eligibility for the 1928 tour. The Auckland-based 
Akarana Maori Association, however, forwarded the 
following resolution to the NZRFU: 
[Te Akarana] regrets that in order to defer to the 
South African opinion, the New Zealand Rugby Union 
has decided to ignore Maori manhood in the selection 
of a New Zealand representative team and feels that 
this decision is a slur on the dignity and manhood 
of the Maori . 17 
The Akarana Maori Association, furthermore, 
contended that the NZRFU should not send the All Blacks 
to South Africa, as the team failed to represent New 
Zealand as a 'united Maori-European people' • 18 Its 
resolution was almost certainly the first instance of a 
Maori organisation questioning the morality of rugby 
contacts between New Zealand and South Africa. The 
Akarana Maori Association, nevertheless, was active 
during the late 1920s in addressing wider Maori concerns 
within New Zealand society. Among its objectives, for 
instance, was the establishment of a lectureship in Maori 
language at Auckland University College. 19 
The Akarana resolution, notwithstanding its appeal 
to the NZRFU to send a team truly representative of New 
n Sun, 8 October 1927. 
18 ibid. 
19 F. Hercock, A Democratic Minority: A Centennial 
History of the Auckland University Students' Association, 
1994, p. 33; K. Sinclair, A History of the University of 
Auckland 1883-1983, 1983, p. 202. 
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Zealand to South Africa, received little support from 
Maori spokespeople. At the time, the general consensus 
within New Zealand was that racial segregation, while 
unfortunate, was part of South African social custom. 
Thus, the All Blacks were obliged to respect that custom, 
in the manner that the 1919 New Zealand Services team and 
the 1921 Springboks conformed to the respective social 
traditions of South Africa and New Zealand. 
The only public figure of note to support the 
Akarana resolution was the Mayor of Christchurch, Rev 
John K. Archer. He was the first Labour Party candidate 
and Minister of Religion to win a mayoralty in New 
Zealand. 20 At a Lyttelton public meeting, Archer remarked 
to an audience of 'thousands' that had he been a selected 
member of the 1928 All Blacks, he would have refused to 
tour a country that would not admit Maori. 21 Archer was 
conceivably the first Pakeha politician to publicly 
oppose the selection of an all-white New Zealand rugby 
team to South Africa. His outspoken support of Maori 
sporting rights, however, failed to attract similar views 
from other leftist commentators. 
The belief that Maori rugby players would be 
20 Press, 30 April 1925; W. H. Scatter, A History of 
Canterbury, 1965, p. 357; J. Sharfe, The Canterbury 
Workers' Educational Association: The Origins and 
Development - 1915 to 1947. A Working Class organisation? 
1990, p. 169. Before his election as Christchurch Mayor 
in April 1925, John Archer had served as vice-president 
of the New Zealand Labour Party. He was also a 
Parliamentary candidate on several occasions. 
n sun, 8 October 1927. 
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humiliated by sporting and social segregation was, 
according to the NZRFU, the basis for their exclusion 
from the 1928 tour. In its response to the Akarana 
resolution, the Rugby Union implied that Maori had to be 
shielded from racist insult.n It added that the Maori 
Advisory Board, established in 1922, supported Maori 
exclusion.n The Maori Advisory Board, however, consisted 
of delegates who were elected by the provincial Rugby 
Unions and not Maori players themselves. 24 Thus, the 
extent to which it represented the interests of Maori 
rugby remains ambiguous. 
The NZRFU, moreover, discounted the suggestion by 
the Akarana Maori Association to cancel the 1928 tour. It 
claimed that the All Blacks were obliged to tour South 
Africa for financial reasons. As the 1921 Springbok tour 
was profitable for New Zealand rugby, the SARB was eager 
to generate similar receipts from the 1928 tour. It 
mentioned that it was 'discourteous' to decline the 
SARB's invitation, and also remarked that it was 'absurd' 
to punish the SARB for racial segregation. 25 Its attempt 
22 Hawke's Bay Herald, 11 October 1927. 
n Press, 12 October 1927. It remains possible that 
the Maori Advisory Board was formed as a response to the 
racial controversy of the 1921 Blackett cablegram. This, 
however, cannot be confirmed due to the lack of available 
sources. 
24 Newnham, pp. 23-24; R. Thompson, Retreat From 
Apartheid, p. 21. Ned Parata was the first Maori Advisory 
Board chairman between 1922 and 1926. He was also an 
honorary representative on the NZRFU Management 
Committee, yet had no voting power. 
~ Hawke's Bay Herald, 11 October 1927. 
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to separate sports and politics, however, overlooked the 
fact that the SARB represented only white South African 
rugby. 
In reaching the decision to exclude Maori from the 
1928 All Blacks, the NZRFU was almost certainly 
influenced by the opinions of its chairman, Stan Dean. In 
the years before the Great War, Dean had experienced the 
social customs of South Africa personally. He was 
employed by the South British Insurance Company in 
Johannesburg, and played rugby for the Mines club. 26 Dean 
would have indisputably informed the NZRFU and Maori 
Advisory Board of white South African racial attitudes. 
Yet, his role surrounding Maori exclusion was overlooked 
by the sporting press. Subsequently, newspaper discussion 
of Maori sporting rights withered following the NZRFU's 
response to the Akarana Maori Asociation. 
The exclusion of Maori rugby players from the 1928 
tour failed to produce debate in New Zealand on the wider 
question of racial discrimination against black South 
Africans. The All Black players generally remained silent 
over inequalities between black and white South Africans. 
Their main focus was to play rugby, and they stood aloof 
from social and political questions. On several 
occasions, one of the All Blacks, Jim Burrows, recorded 
his observations of South African race relations for 
publication in the Lyttelton Times. His columns, 
nonetheless, were careful to avoid overt approval or 
26 McLean, Rugby Legends, pp. 117, 120. 
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criticism of race relations in South Africa.v 
The All Blacks, while usually detached from South 
African racial issues, were forced to encounter black 
South African anger during the first week of their tour. 
Coinciding with the All Blacks' arrival in Cape Town was 
the 30 May 1928 'flag riots'. As Afrikaners celebrated 
the hoisting of the (Afrikaner) Union flag over 
Parliament, 28 black protesters tore down Union flags 
flying from buildings and cars. The Union flag was 
interpreted by protesters as a symbol of Afrikaner 
domination and black oppression. However, they cheered 
buildings and cars that flew the Union Jack. While 
several of the All Blacks witnessed the flag riots, they 
neither supported nor condemned black outrage. Instead, 
Jim Burrows observed that the protesters appeared to be 
'absolutely pro-British', with 'a special grudge against 
the Dutch' . 29 
As the flag riots intensified, a number of the All 
Blacks narrowly avoided direct involvement and injury. 
One of the players, Neil McGregor, was struck by a brick 
as he and other players were driven through Cape Town, 
v Lyttelton Times, 5 July 1928. 
28 See o. Pirow, James Barry Munnick Hertzog, No 
publishing date, p. 123; E. Walker, A History of Southern 
Africa, 1957, p. 613. The Union flag was the ancient flag 
of the House of Orange with three small flags - the Union 
Jack and the two flags of the former Boer Republics 
(Transvaal and Orange Free State). 
29 Lyttelton Times, 5 July 1928. 
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but was not hurt. 30 Newspaper reports of the riots, 
however, failed to mention whether the cars that the All 
Blacks travelled in flew the Union Jack or Afrikaner 
Union flag. Some of the players also witnessed rioters 
attack a woman who was holding a Union flag, before 
snatching it from her. The same group proceeded to smash 
a glass bottle over the head of a man who attempted to 
help the woman. The players considered offering 
assistance to both victims, but were unable to get close 
enough to them. 31 Had they become involved, they may have 
also suffered injury. 
The Cape Town flag riots proved to be . the only 
occasion for the All Blacks to witness black South 
African discontent against racial segregation. The 
players subsequently visited a black school in 
Burghersdorp (Transvaal). Jim Burrows, once again, 
described the occasion to the Lyttelton Times. Whereas 
Afrikaners formed the bulk of Burghersdorp's white 
population, Burrows noted that school lessons were taught 
in English.n However, it is unlikely that his remark of 
a 'special grudge' held by black South Africans against 
'the Dutch' (during the flag riots) also applied to the 
30 ibid. McGregor kept the brick as a momento of Cape 
Town. For a recent example of All Black embroilment in 
South African civil disturbances, see T. Newnham, A Cry 




Afrikaans language. 33 Until the introduction of 
apartheid, English was the customary language of 
instruction in black primary and secondary education. 
The All Blacks, in a subsequent visit to Cape Town, 
continued to observe the local black community, albeit 
within a sporting context. In the only reference to black 
rugby, the players noted that 'the Malays' ('Coloureds') 
were as enthusiastic as the Afrikaners about rugby. 34 
They overlooked the broader issue of sporting 
segregation, nor did they comment on the extent of 
rugby's popularity among black South Africans. 
Nevertheless, black rugby was played in the Cape 
Province, Border, and Transvaal. In some instances it was 
organised on a colour blind or 'non-racial' basis between 
Africans and 'Coloureds'.~ 
As the 1928 All Black tour failed to produce 
widespread debate on racial issues, rugby affairs 
provided the only incident of note. New Zealand rugby 
followers did not receive news of a scandal that ranked 
alongside the 1921 Blackett cablegram. Instead, rumours 
of a falling out between the All Black captain, Maurice 
Brownlie, and his vice-captain, Mark Nicholls (supposedly 
33 The June 1976 Soweto uprising was sparked by the 
refusal of primary and secondary school students to learn 
in Afrikaans (English was the preferred language of 
instruction). Coinciding with the Soweto riots was the 
1976 All Black tour of South Africa. 
34 Lyttelton Times, 5 July 1928. 
35 Archer and Bouillon, The South African Game, pp. 
59, 117. 
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over playing tactics) appeared in the New Zealand 
sporting press. Both players dismissed the rumours, when 
the All Blacks returned to New Zealand in October 1928. 36 
The 1928 All Black tour was customarily placed by 
middle class New Zealand commentators within an 
imperialist (rather than racial) context. Throughout the 
1920s, New Zealand political and social elites remained 
imperial-minded, despite the changing political 
constitution of the British Empire. At the 1926 Imperial 
Conference, political sovereignty and equality between 
Britain and the white Dominions was the basis of the 
Balfour Declaration. 37 New Zealand political leaders, 
unlike their South African and Canadian peers, 'deplored' 
the Balfour Declaration and believed that New Zealand 
'already had enough independence' . 38 
Despite the uncertain future of imperial political 
links, the view of New Zealand political elites in 
relation to New Zealand and South African rugby tours 
remained imperialist. At an official farewell banquet, 
the Prime Minister, Gordon Coates, spoke of the 1928 All 
36 Details of the alleged Brownlie-Nicholls feud 
appear in the Lyttelton Times, 3 July 1928, 23 August 
1928, 10 October 1928; Press, 6 October 1928; W. 
McCarthy, Hakal The All Black Story, 1968, pp. 120-121; 
McLean, New Zealand Rugby Legends, pp. 161-162. 
37 N. Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, 1969, 
pp. 230-236; W. D. Mcintyre, Colonies into Commonwealth, 
1974, pp. 140-141; Pirow, pp. 114-118; Sinclair, A 
Destiny Apart, pp. 101-103. 
38 Sinclair, A Destiny Apart, pp. 102-103. 
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Blacks as New Zealand representives among 'strange people 
in a strange land'. He added that 'nothing could bring 
New Zealand and South Africa together more quickly than 
sport'.~ Coates persisted with the concept of rugby as 
a means of imperial diplomacy, when he and 4,000 people 
farewelled the All Blacks at the Wellington waterfront. 40 
Not to be outdone, the Labour Party offered its support 
to the All Blacks at its annual conference. Labour, 
unlike Reform, distanced itself from the imperialism with 
which sporting events were frequently invested. Employing 
internationalist rhetoric, Labour acknowledged the role 
of previous New Zealand rugby teams in contributing to 
'international goodwill and understanding'. 41 
In comparison to conservative politicians such as 
Gordon Coates, New Zealand sporting officialdom was less 
openly imperialist when discussing the 1928 tour. They 
generally portrayed the All Blacks as upstanding 
representatives of 'Dominion' honour. The New Zealand 
Olympic Council, in conjunction with other sporting 
organisations, described the tour as a 'great mission' to 
uphold New Zealand's sporting reputation. 42 The idea of 
the All Blacks as flag bearers of Dominion pride was 
mentioned by Canterbury rugby administrators when 
referring to local All Blacks. The players were also seen 
39 Press, 13 April 1928, 14 April 1928. 
40 Lyttelton Times, 14 April 1928. 
41 Press, 13 April 1928. 
42 Lyttelton Times, 14 April 1928. 
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as ambassadors to develop wider relations with South 
Africa. 43 
The notion of an imperial sporting network received 
substantially less comment from south African political 
and sporting elites throughout the 1928 tour. Instead, 
the standard rhetoric of South African commentators 
alluded to the tour as an internationalist event. 
Imperial-centred cliches, when expressed, usually 
originated from centres of strong Anglo influence such as 
the larger cities, Natal, and Southern Rhodesia. On the 
other hand, the majority of Afrikaners supported the 
anti-imperialist National Party - the primary vehicle of 
'Afrikaner nationalism'. National's policies included 
South African sovereign independence, Dominion equality 
with Britain, and white unity through linguistic equality 
between Afrikaners and Anglos.« In comparison, the South 
African Party (SAP), which had governed since 1910, 
supported Anglo-Afrikaner conciliation and South African 
loyalty to the British Empire. 
The withering of imperialist sentiment within South 
Africa during the 1920s was manifested by the political 
defeat of Jan Smuts and the SAP by the National Party at 
the 1924 election. Subsequently, James Hertzog became 
Prime Minister of an Afrikaner nationalist-dominated 
43 Press, 2 April 1928, 5 April 1928. 
« R. de Villiers, "Afrikaner Nationalism", in Wilson 
and Thompson (Eds), Oxford History of South Africa: Vol. 
Two, pp. 367, 369-370. 
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Coalition Government. 45 Yet, Hertzog, in comparison to 
his more intransigent colleagues, defined Afrikaner 
nationalism as Anglo-Afrikaner unity, rather than 
Afrikaner domination. 46 Moreover, he did not support 
South African secession from the Empire publicly. In his 
first speech as Prime Minister, Hertzog referred to 
Britain as South Africa's 'first and best friend'.~ His 
goal of South African autonomy, moreover, was largely 
fufilled by the Balfour Declaration's recognition of 
equal status between Britain and the Dominions. 48 
The anti-imperialist influence on South African 
politics also imbued South African sporting opinion 
during the 1928 tour. The All Blacks, while received 
enthusiastically by Anglo South African commentators, 
were rarely depicted as patrons of the Empire. In Natal, 
arguably the most imperial-minded of South African 
provinces, the players were apparently 'overwhelmed' by 
their reception from locals. 49 They were greeted by ci vie 
leaders, SARB officials, and an exclusively white 
45 D. O'Meara, Volkskapitalisme, 1983, p. 31. The 
Coalition Government elected in 1924 consisted of the 
Afrikaner-dominated National Party and the Labour Party. 
It attracted the support of urban white workers from a 
predominately Afrikaner background. 
~ de Villiers, p. 380; Pirow, p. 100. 
47 Pirow, p. 104. 
48 Mansergh, pp. 230-236; Mcintyre, Colonies into 
Commonwealth, pp. 140-141; Pirow, pp. 114-118. 
49 Press, 24 May 1928. 
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gathering.~ Civic welcoming speeches failed to mention 
the sporting Empire. Nonetheless, street-theatre antics 
were provided by a 'burlesque Springbok football team' 
performing 'Zulu war cries'. The cultural buffoonery was 
maintained by haka-performing New Zealand supporters, 
bearing a large replica silver fern." 
Anglo celebration of the All Blacks re-appeared 
within an urban setting throughout the 1928 tour, albeit 
without overt references to the Empire. At times, the 
team's reception paralleled that given to the 1921 
Springboks by New Zealand rugby followers. As they 
journeyed, crowds accumulated to catch a glimpse of the 
team, while larger towns and cities staged official 
greetings. 52 Symbolic inter-imperial relations was 
alluded to at Cape Town, when the All Black captain, 
Maurice Brownlie was photographed with Jan Smuts, 53 
indisputably the most imperial-minded of South African 
politicians. The presence of Smuts was overlooked by the 
South African and New Zealand sporting press. 
Nevertheless, newspapers and National Government Cabinet 
Ministers compared the All Blacks' welcome as on a par to 
that given to the Prince of Wales on his previous South 
50 Lyttel ton Times, 5 July 1928. 
51 ibid. 
52 ibid. The South African press commented that 
'thousands' turned up at Johannesburg to welcome the All 
Blacks. 
53 Greyvenstein, Springbok Saga, p. 8 O. 
52 
African visit. 54 
The relationship between the All Blacks and 
Afrikaners was generally distant, without any reference 
to the sporting Empire. The All Blacks felt that many 
Afrikaners, especially in the Orange Free State and 
Transvaal, invested the 1928 tour games with wider 
nationalist overtones. In later years, Jim Burrows 
recalled that games against Afrikaner-dominated teams 
became 'more than rugby', and a symbolic continuation of 
the Anglo-Boer war. 55 The only difference was that the 
All Blacks was the 'enemy', instead of the British Army. 
Moreover, the 1928 Springbok test teams were increasingly 
'Afrikanerised'. At least 80%, or 22 of the 27 Springboks 
who played against the All Blacks were Afrikaners, 
including the captain, Phil Mostert. Approximately 37% 
{10) of the Springboks had also attended Stellenbosch 
University (the intellectual home of Afrikaner 
nationalism) , or played for the Stellenbosch club team. 56 
The increased Afrikaner representation in South 
African provincial and national rugby teams coincided 
with the political tenure of the Hertzog National 
54 Lyttelton Times, 5 July 1928; Press, 30 May 1928. 
55 J. Burrows, Pathway Among Men, 197 4, p. 4 7. 
56 F. Labuschagne, Goodbye Newlands, Farewell Eden 
Park, 1974, p. 215. For a record of the provinces and 
clubs that individual Springboks played for, see T. 
Goodwin, The Complete Who's Who of International Rugby, 
1987, passim. 
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Government. The introduction of linguistic equality57 by 
National enabled greater employment opportunities for 
Afrikaners in government departments at Pretoria. Many 
Afrikaner employees were Stellenbosch University 
graduates, and subsequently performed the role of 'rugby 
missionaries' in the Northern Transvaal. 58 As 
Stellenbosch was the hub of the Afrikaner nationalist 
intelligentsia, its graduates were unlikely to support 
the concept of an imperial sporting network. 
Despite the customary distance that existed between 
the All Blacks and many Afrikaners, there were sporadic 
cases of affability between the two. In a light-hearted 
exchange, the Afrikaner Mayor of a high veldt town wished 
the All Blacks good luck, and defeat in the test 
matches. 59 Furthermore, at a Pretoria dinner, the All 
Black manager, William Hornig, quipped that during his 
previous visit to South Africa, "we were fighting your 
blokes in the Boer War. 1160 Informal banter aside, 
Hornig's comment may have been interpreted by some as 
offensive. 
South African rugby administrators, unlike their New 
Zealand counterparts during the 1921 Springbok tour, 
57 L. Thompson, A History of south Africa, 1990, p. 
160. 
58 A. Grundlingh, "Playing for Power? Rugby, 
Afrikaner Nationalism and Masculinity in South Africa, c. 
1900-70 11 , The International Journal of the History of 
Sport, Vol. II, No. J, Dec. 1994, pp. 410-411. 
59 Lyttel ton Times, 5 July 1928. 
60 McLean, New Zealand Rugby Legends, p. 161. 
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rarely discussed the social context of the 1928 tour. 
Instead, they elected to view it as principally a 
sporting occasion. The only comment relating to the wider 
social benefit of New Zealand and South African rugby 
contacts was from the SARB president, Andries 'Sport' 
Pienaar. 61 His remark was vaguely internationalist, and 
overlooked the theme of imperial sporting relations. 
Speaking at the conclusion of the tour, Pienaar stated 
that the All Black visit had generated 'mutual interest' 
in New Zealand and South Africa, and 'friendships' 
between their respective players.a 
New Zealand political leaders described the All 
Blacks' return to New Zealand with less imperialist 
bombast, unlike the pre and post-tour rhetoric of 
previous rugby occasions. Gordon Coates, in a cablegram 
to his South African counterpart, James Hertzog, 
mentioned that New Zealand and South African rugby 
contacts encouraged 'mutual contact and association', 
within a wider imperial context.~ The absence of 
imperialist slogans was more apparent during a Wellington 
civic function honouring the All Blacks. A Reform Cabinet 
Minister, K. s. Williams, remarked that the team had 
contributed to 'friendly relations' between New Zealand 
61 See Dictionary of South African Biography: Volume 
IV, 1981, p. 457. 
62 Lyttelton Times, 8 September 1928. 
63 ibid. 
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and South Africa. 64 Williams, unlike Coates, did not 
allude to the Empire, but mentioned simply that the All 
Blacks had behaved as 'gentlemen' during their tour.~ 
The post-1928 tour rhetoric of the New Zealand 
sporting press was often more imperialist than that of 
conservative politicians. The Christchurch Press 
commented that the All Blacks had made a most favourable 
impression in South Africa.M The players, according to 
the Press, also enhanced imperial ties between the two 
countries. 67 The imperialist theme was echoed by William 
Hornig. He remarked that the All Blacks had created 'a 
small link in the chain of Empire'. 68 Nonetheless, the 
NZRFU, in a post-tour cablegram to the SARB, failed to 
mention the sporting Empire. Instead, it hoped that the 
New Zealand and South African 'friendship' was 'further 
cemented' by the All Blacks. 69 
New Zealand and South African rugby contacts, 
through the 1928 All Black tour of South Africa, 
continued to raise imperialist and racial questions. 
Imperialist slogans among middle class New Zealand 
commentators was generally less bombastic than that of 
64 Lyttelton Times, 10 October 1928. 
65 ibid. 
M Press, 4 October 1928. 
67 ibid. 
68 Lyttelton Times, 8 September 1928. 
69 Lyttelton Times, 5 September 1928. 
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the 1921 Springbok tour. Within South Africa, the 1928 
tour generated divergent reactions along linguistic 
divisions. Anglo South Africans greeted the All Blacks 
with enthusiasm, without resorting to overt imperialism. 
Afrikaners, in contrast, rejected the imperial context of 
New Zealand and South African rugby tours. As Springbok 
rugby teams became dominated numerically by Afrikaners, 
South African rugby was often invested with Afrikaner 
nationalist connotations. 
The central racial issue of the 1928 All Black tour 
was the exclusion of Maori rugby players from south 
Africa. The NZRFU felt that it had to respect the 
segregationist ethos of South African society, and sought 
to 'protect' Maori from white South African racism. 
Hence, the most renowned All Black of the early twentieth 
century, George Nepia, was ruled ineligible to tour. At 
best, Maori exclusion aroused limited debate from 
political and sporting commentators. The only vociferous 
critics of the NZRFU's decision were the Akarana Maori 
Association, and John K. Archer, Labour Mayor of 
Christchurch. They believed that Maori exclusion from the 
1928 tour was hypocritical, in that New Zealanders often 
boasted of the inclusionist tradition of New Zealand 
sport and society. Notwithstanding Archer and the Akarana 
Maori Association, few New Zealanders examined the 
paradox of sporting and social inclusion, while Maori 
were denied sporting and social rights in South Africa. 
CHAPTER THREE 
The 1937 Springbok Tour of New 
Zealand: 
57 
'The Arawa requests that no Maori be called on to play 
the Springboks.' (Arawa Confederation) 
The 1937 Springbok rugby tour of New Zealand 
coincided with increasing New Zealand awareness of racial 
issues on the one hand, and declining imperialist 
identification on the other. Unlike the 1921 Springbok 
and 1928 All Black tours, Maori criticism of rugby 
contacts between New Zealand and South Africa emerged on 
a nationwide basis. Many Maori iwi and individuals feared 
that racial controversy of the kind similar to the 
Blackett cablegram would re-surface during the 1937 tour. 
Hence, they threatened to boycott sporting and social 
occasions involving the Springboks. Subsequently, the 
SARB assured the NZRFU that Maori would be treated by the 
Springboks as equals, although a match with the New 
Zealand Maori XV was not scheduled. As the racial 
question dominated the sporting press, the theme of the 
sporting Empire was less conspicuous during the 1937 
tour. South Africa and (to a lesser extent) New Zealand 
began to assert greater political autonomy, following the 
1931 Statute of Westminster. Within a sporting context, 
the British Empire Games had replaced team sports as the 
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leading imperial sporting event. Consequently, the 
imperialist cliches of previous tours were replaced with 
rugby-centred slogans which simply acclaimed New Zealand 
and South African sporting relations. 
The scheduling of a Springbok rugby tour of New 
Zealand in 1937 produced, for the first time, a 
widespread reaction from Maori iwi and individuals. They 
feared that sporting and social contact between Maori and 
Springbok would inflame similar controversy to that of 
the Blackett cablegram, following the 1921 Springbok-
Maori XV match. The increase of Maori protest against 
possible Springbok insult took place within a context of 
social reform initiated by the First Labour Government. 
Among Labour's objectives was greater social and economic 
parity between Maori and Pakeha. It introduced equality 
of state pensions between Maori and Pakeha, and increased 
expenditure on Maori Land development schemes, health and 
education. 1 Yet, despite Labour's reformist agenda, 
inequality of social and economic opportunity between 
Maori and Pakeha remained. 
Rugby football, unlike wider New Zealand society, 
was an arena where Maori often out-performed Pakeha. 
However, a growing number of Maori were critical of the 
1 Sinclair, History of New Zealand, pp. 274-275; 
King, "Between Two Worlds", pp. 289, 300. Labour 
increased Maori pensions and unemployment benefits to 
match those of Pakeha, extended Maori Land development 
schemes, and increased Maori education and health 
expenditure. 
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NZRFU double-standard towards Maori sporting rights vis-
a-vis New Zealand and South African rugby exchanges. In 
addition to seeking inclusion in future All Black tours 
of South Africa, Maori also demanded recognition as 
'equals' from touring Springbok players. The Arawa Maori, 
however, were pessimistic that the 1937 Springboks would 
view Maori as equals. In a 1936 memorial to the NZRFU, 
they requested that Maori should boycott matches and 
official functions during the 1937 tour. The Arawa also 
proposed that the New Zealand Maori XV should not play 
against the Springboks. 2 
The basis for the Arawa memorial' s sporting and 
social boycott of the 1937 tour was an avoidance of the 
'unpleasant incidents' which took place during the 1921 
Springbok tour. It remarked that Maori did not wish to 
distress 'distinguished visitors from an important 
section of the British Commonwealth' with their presence 
at matches and functions. 3 It referred to the ill-
tempered 1921 Springbok-Maori XV fixture, and claimed 
that the Maori players were racially abused by the 
Springboks. It also mentioned an incident in which a 
number of Maori women suffered 'objectionable treatment' 
from the Springboks during a hui at Ohinemutu. The 
memorial, however, failed to recount what exactly 
happened between the South Africans and Maori at 
2 Press, 24 July 1936. 
3 ibid. 
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Ohinemutu. 4 Furthermore, the sporting press had 
overlooked the Ohinemutu hui during the 1921 tour. 
While the Arawa memorial' s primary grievance was 
Springbok racism against Maori, it alluded to the NZRFU's 
complicity in Maori exclusion from the 1928 tour of South 
Africa. It accused the Rugby Union of adopting the 
'Springbok attitude' of sporting segregation in the 
selection of the 1928 All Blacks. 5 It also believed that 
the NZRFU had sacrificed the inclusionist ethos that 
imbued New Zealand sport and society. According to the 
Arawa, the Rugby Union had rejected 'a definite 
principle' of sporting democracy which recognised playing 
ability, 'regardless of race, creed, or colour'. 6 
The Arawa memorial had an unprecedented effect on 
Maori attitudes towards New Zealand and South African 
rugby relations. Unlike previous tours, Maori 
denunciation of South African sporting segregation was 
supported publicly by many Maori organisations and 
spokespeople. The memorial was given 'unqualified 
support' from the Akarana Maori Association - previously 
the solitary Maori group to castigate Maori exclusion 
from the 1928 tour. 7 The Akarana Maori Association also 




7 New Zealand Herald, 25 July 1936. 
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Maori. 8 Indeed, it was supported by Te Puea Herangi and 
the Waikato Maori. 9 Te Puea and Waikato, unlike the 
Arawa, had opposed Maori participation in the Great War 
and led a campaign against Maori conscription. 10 
Moreover, Te Puea had become a national Maori figure by 
the late 1920s, following the establishment of 
Turangawaewae Marae at Ngaruawahia. 11 
A number of Maori spokespeople offered conditional 
support for the Arawa memorial. Instead of advocating a 
full boycott of the 1937 tour, they hoped that the SARB 
would guarantee that the Springbok players view Maori as 
their equals. The Bishop of Aoteoroa, Rev Frederick A. 
Bennett, 12 believed that Maori would have 'no feeling' 
against the Springboks if the SARB gave such an 
assurance . 13 The Marlborough Maori also supported the 
notion of a SARB guarantee of Springbok willingness to 
meet Maori as their equals. However, they were sceptical 
whether the SARB would be as obliging if Maori were part 
of an All Black touring team to South Africa . 14 
8 ibid. 
9 Press, 28 July 1936. 
10 King, "Between Two Worlds", pp. 290-291; Walker, 
Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, p. 181. 
11 King, "Between Two Worlds", pp. 290-291. 
12 ibid. , pp. 2 8 8, 2 9 3 . Frederick Bennett was the 
first Bishop of Aoteoroa. He was previously a member of 
the Young Maori Party alongside Apirana Ngata and Te 
Rangi Hiroa. 
13 Press, 28 July 1936. 
14 Press, 1 August 1936. 
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While the Arawa memorial attracted various degrees 
of support from Maoridom, it was never unanimously 
endorsed. A minority of Maori felt that a sporting and 
social boycott of the 1937 tour would prevent Maori from 
displaying the inclusionist nature of New Zealand to the 
Springboks. It remains conceivable that Maori disapproval 
of the memorial was overstated by the sporting press. It 
was limited to the North Island's East Coast, and a lone 
Tuahiwi (North Canterbury) resident, Te Ariatua Pitama. 
Furthermore, it was almost certainly inspired, on 
occasions, by personal and tribal envy of the Arawa. 
An indication that the extent of Maori opposition to 
the Arawa memorial was inflated was presented by the 
Christchurch Press. Throughout 1936, . it published the 
opinions of Te Ariatua Pitama on a regular basis, 
including a personal attack against the Arawa. He accused 
the Arawa, who often hosted overseas visitors at Rotorua, 
of 'commercialised' and 'spoilt' behaviour. 15 Although he 
had apparently no connection with Maori rugby, Pitama 
remarked that South Island Maori would play the 
Springboks if such a match was arranged . 16 His views were 
rejected immediately by North Canterbury Maori 
spokespeople, who offered 'wholehearted' support for the 
Arawa memorial. The Tuahiwi Football· Club president, 'J. 
T. Piki', recalled the 'Springbok attitude' of the 1921 
15 Press, 28 July 1936. 
16 Press, 25 July 1936. 
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tour. 17 While Piki failed to specify exactly what he 
meant by 'Springbok attitude', he was unquestionably 
referring to the Blackett cablegram against the Maori XV. 
The idea that Maori should demonstrate their 
sporting and social inclusion to the Springboks was 
supported by East Coast Maori spokespeople and the local 
sporting press. The Gisborne Times, in an editorial, 
condemned the 'unsportsmanlike' and 'undignified' 
behaviour of the 1921 Springboks towards Maori. 18 on the 
other hand, it believed that Maori should display their 
sportsmanship and 'social culture' to the Springboks. 6 
A local Maori spokesperson, P. T. Tomoana, added that the 
Arawa memorial was supported only by Maori in the 
Auckland province. On a more personal note, he vilified 
the Arawa Maori as 'Te Arawa Mangai Nui' (Arawa with the 
big mouth) . 20 
East Coast Maori opposition to the Arawa memorial, 
albeit from anonymous sources, was often inflated by the 
sporting press. A Maori Advisory Board and Tairawhiti 
(Poverty Bay and East Coast) Association official felt 
17 Press, 27 July 1936; Chester and McMillan, 
Visitors, pp. 114, 118; Swan, History of New Zealand 
Rugby: Volume One, pp. 352-353. 'S. M. J. Piki', a Maori 
rugby representative between 1910 and 1913, is listed as 
an administrator in a photograph of the 1921 Maori XV. 
However, the Christchurch Press of 27 July 1936 refers to 
'J. T. Piki', a Maori rugby representative who 'played' 
against the 1921 Springboks. 
18 Gisborne Times, 24 July 1936. 
19 ibid. 
20 Press, 27 July 1936. 
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that the Maori Advisory Board should have received the 
Arawa memorial before the NZRFU. He claimed that the 
memorial was opposed by Maori, and predicted that the 
Springboks would respect New Zealand's inclusionist 
tradition. 21 Wairoa-based 1921 Maori XV players suggested 
that Maori and Springbok should resolve their grievances 
on the playing field. They accused the Arawa of 'making 
a mountain out of a molehill'. Furthermore, they believed 
that Arawa rejection of sporting and social contact with 
the Springboks was related to their supposed lack of 
'good footballers'.n 
Pakeha sporting commentators, especially top-level 
rugby administrators, generally supported Maori sporting 
participation in relation to the 1937 tour. That some of 
the same administrators supported Maori exclusion .from 
the 1928 tour of South Africa was overlooked by the 
sporting press. The NZRFU chairman, Stan Dean, officially 
advised the Arawa that 'the strongest and wisest course' 
of action was for the Springboks to respect New Zealand 
social custom. 23 He added that the inclusionist nature of 
New Zealand sport would act as a striking demonstration 
of racial 'co-operation and understanding' to the 
Springboks.~ Canterbury Rugby Union administrators 
believed that Maori should play for their provincial 
21 Press, 25 July 1936. 
22 Press, 28 July 1936. 
23 Press, 7 August 1936. 
~ ibid. 
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teams against the Springboks. Their opinion was that the 
Maori Advisory Board should decide whether to arrange a 
Springbok-Maori match, instead of 'individual Maori' with 
'coloured' views.~ 
The Arawa memorial, on occasions, received a mixed 
response from rugby spokespeople, especially those within 
Auckland rugby circles. The Auckland Rugby Union declined 
to officially comment on the memorial, as its theme was 
seen as 'too sensitive' . 26 More forthcoming were two 
players who had toured South Africa with New Zealand 
representative teams, 'Snow' Lucas (1919), and his 
brother, Fred Lucas ( 1928) . They supported Maori sporting 
and social participation in the 1937 tour. On the other 
hand, they were emphatic that Maori inclusion in touring 
teams to South Africa would be 'impossible' . 27 A touch 
judge from the 1921 Springbok-Maori XV match, 'Tom' 
Jones, supported Maori participation in provincial 
matches against the Springboks. However, Jones, who was 
almost certainly in a better position than most to 
evaluate sporting relations between Springbok and Maori, 
felt it 'unwise' to schedule a game with the Maori XV. 28 
The public response to the Arawa memorial was 
followed by greater press recognition of New Zealand's 
inclusionist ethos in relation to rugby exchanges with 
~ Press, 25 July 1936. 




South Africa. The Christchurch Press, in contrast to its 
approval of New Zealand and South African rugby contacts 
in 1921 and 1928, now argued that the Arawa memorial 
raised racial questions which transcended the playing 
field. It was 'only natural', an editorial claimed, that 
Maori wished to avoid the controversy of 1921.~ It also 
mentioned that the idea of 'friendly association' and 
'mutual respect' between Maori and Pakeha should not be 
imperiled by white South African racism. 30 
The racial context of rugby relations between New 
Zealand and South Africa was analysed, for the first 
time, within Labour Party publications. A correspondent 
to the pro-Labour Standard, 'O'Haggis', accused the NZRFU 
of 'inconsiderate' handling of Maori rugby, and described 
New Zealand and South Africa rugby tours as 'petty 
parochialism' . 31 'O'Haggis' believed that the Rugby Union 
ranked imperial rugby rivalry ahead of race relations 
between Maori and Pakeha. 32 However, members of the 
Labour Government, including its Maori MP's, remained 
silent on the question of Maori sporting rights and rugby 
contacts with South Africa. 
The extent of public debate over the Arawa memorial 
compelled the NZRFU into quelling Maori fears of 
Springbok insult. At a conference involving various Maori 
29 Press, 27 July 1936. 
30 ibid. 
"Standard, 29 July 1936. 
32 ibid. 
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groups, the Rugby Union resolved to obtain a SARB 
assurance that the Springboks would view Maori as their 
equals, instead of 'members of an inferior race'." If 
the SARB gave such an assurance, Maori would be 'only too 
willing' to play against the Springboks.~ Consequently, 
support for the NZRFU's actions - and also for a match 
between the Maori XV and Springboks - emerged at a 
Gisborne hui. 35 While the 1937 tour itinerary failed to 
include a Springbok-Maori XV fixture, individual Maori 
remained eligible to play for their provinces, and, if 
chosen, the All Blacks. 36 Thus, Maori apprehension that 
the 1921 controversy would be repeated appeared to be 
allayed. 
Support for the Arawa memorial from Anglo South 
African and expatriate New Zealand correspondents 
appeared in the Natal Advertiser (and New Zealand 
sporting press). A 1924 Springbok forward, 'Bill' Payn,n 
believed that Maori hesitation at playing the Springboks 
was 'regrettable', and the attitude of 'certain South 
Africans' disgraceful. He recalled that the 1921 
Springboks, despite their racism towards black South 
Africans, were happy to accept Maori hospitality. 
Moreover, he added, some of the players had danced with 
33 Press, 14 September 1936. 
~ ibid. 
35 Press, 15 September 1936. 
36 Press, 9 November 1936. 
37 See Greyvenstein, Springbok Saga, pp. 132, 287. 
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Maori women. 38 Yet, within South Africa, people of 
different skin colour could not attend comparable 
functions such as dances. Payn's views were supported by 
an anonymous expatriate New Zealander, who depicted Maori 
as a 'fine, noble and generous' people who were more 
likely to pity Springbok racism than to take offence at 
it. 39 
Anglo South African support of Maori sporting rights 
was complemented by denunciation of white racism against 
black South Africans. 'Bill' Payn, not content with 
berating Springbok racism against Maori, described white 
South African racial fears as 'irrational and 
childish' . 40 An anonymous correspondent described racial 
segregation as 'regrettable' politically and socially, 
and 'damnable' when it affected sport. Furthermore, he 
denounced the 'back-veldt' attitude that black south 
Africans are 'untouchable except with a sjambok 
(Whip) I• 41 
Although the SARB remained silent on the prospect of 
Springbok-Maori contact, the 1937 Springboks would 
presumbaly respect the inclusionist custom of New 
Zealand. If fears existed that Maori would suffer racial 
insult, they were quelled with the arrival of the 
Springboks in New Zealand. The South African players were 





apparently happy at the prospect of sporting and social 
contact with Maori. 42 Subsequently, an Arawa 
spokesperson, H. Tai Mitchell, remarked that the 
Springbok expression of goodwill would be reciprocated by 
Maori throughout New Zealand. Mitchell's only regret was 
that the South Africans had delayed in stating their 
desire to meet Maori.a Had they not, then a Springbok-
Maori XV game may have been scheduled. 
Despite the non-scheduling of a match against the 
Maori XV, the Springboks played against Maori in several 
provincial games. Included in the combined Poverty Bay-
Bay of Plenty-East Coast XV against the Springboks were 
five previous New Zealand Maori representatives.M 
Furthermore, three Maori players were selected for the 
1937 All Blacks. A Hawke's Bay prop forward and All Black 
from the 1936 season, Everard Jackson,~ played in all 
three test matches along with 'Tori' Reid, the Hawke's 
Bay lock who represented the All Blacks during 1935 and 
1936. Bill Phillips, a King Country winger, made his All 
Black debut in the second test, and was considered 
unlucky not to retain his place for the third test. 46 
42 Press, 23 July 1937. 
43 ibid. 
M Chester and McMillan, Visitors, pp. 217-218. 
45 See Chester and McMillan, Encyclopedia, p. 102. 
Everard Jackson's father, Frederick, was English-born and 
played for the 1908 Anglo-Welsh team. 
46 A. c. Parker, The Springboks: 1891-1970, 1970, p. 
103. 
70 
The principal social occasion involving Maori and 
Springbok during the 1937 tour was a visit to Rotorua, 
several days before the third test. Ironically, the Arawa 
Maori acted as hosts to the Springboks. The Rotorua visit 
aroused minimal press coverage, apart from photographs in 
the New Zealand Herald which showed Maori women welcoming 
the Springbok players in traditional fashion. 47 The 
occasion was free of controversy, and the Springbok 
assistant manager, Alex de Villiers, remarked that the 
players were 'greatly impressed' with Rotorua. In 
particular, they enjoyed the concerts arranged for them 
by the Arawa Maori. 48 
The extent to which the Springboks were impressed by 
their visit to Rotorua can be appraised by remarks from 
Danie Craven, the Springbok vice-captain. While Craven 
was forthright with his racial views, the sporting press 
overlooked his commentary. On black-white relations in 
South Africa, Craven described the 'native problem' as 
very delicate. He argued that white South African 
attitudes of racial superiority were natural, as whites 
considered black South Africans to be 'very primitive'. 49 
He ridiculed comparisons between black South Africans and 
Maori, but admitted to Springbok prejudices against Maori 
n New Zealand Herald, 23 September 1937. Additional 
photographic evidence of apparently sociable contact 
between Maori and Springbok appears in Greyvenstein, p. 
116. . 
48 New Zealand Herald, 22 September 1937. 
49 Cited by D. Cameron (Ed), Memorable Moments in New 
Zealand Sport, 1979, p. 22. 
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before the team's New Zealand arrival. Hence, a match 
against the Maori XV was not included on the Springbok 
itinerary. 50 
Danie Craven was not the only Springbok to express 
his views on South African race relations. The New 
Zealand public, through the sporting press, received a 
rural perspective of black-white relations from the 
Springbok captain, Phil Nel. Speaking as a Natal farmer, 
Nel described his own position as 'purely executive'. He 
simply had to "[tell] the natives their tasks for the day 
and they do them. 1151 In contrast, Nel believed that New 
Zealand farmers had a 'rigorous' occupation. 52 
The sporting press reported a more violent aspect of 
South African race relations - the lynching of a black 
South African by a mob of white Vereeniging (Transvaal) 
residents. 53 When confronted with the news, the Springbok 
flanker, Lucas Strachan (who had worked as a Vereeniging 
police officer) , dismissed the lynching. He believed that 
the locals would not commit such an act of violence.~ 
Nevertheless, throughout the 1937 tour, New Zealand 
so ibid. 
51 Press, 19 August 1937. 
52 ibid. 
53 Dominion, 24 September 1937. The lynching was 
supposedly in retaliation to the death of three 
Vereeniging police officers during a 'beer raid' clash 
with black residents. 
~ ibid. Danie Craven claimed that he was not 
surprised by reports of the lynching and felt it was 
'probably true'. 
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political and sporting commentators remained silent on 
black-white relations in South Africa. 
The 1937 Springbok tour offered not only a window on 
the issue of race relations, but also, by providing a 
point of convergence between sport, race and nationalism, 
opened up wider social issues. At the centre of these 
issues lay the changing meaning of imperial sporting 
contacts. The 1937 tour was largely devoid of the pious 
imperialist platitudes which accompanied earlier New 
Zealand and South African rugby tours. In both countries, 
Anglocentric identification had declined throughout the 
1930s, although it was never a powerful aspect of 
Afrikaner society. Moreover, economic and political 
considerations within the Empire led to a weakening of 
imperial links between Britain and the white Dominions. 
By 1930, Britain had recalled empire loans from the 
Dominions to re-scale its budget." Moreover, the 1931 
Statute of Westminster provided a legal manifestation of 
the 1926 Balfour Declaration. It confirmed Dominion 
parliamentary sovereignty and completed the process of 
full equality with Britain, albeit within the 
'Commonweal th' . 56 
The Statute of Westminster effectively fufilled the 
political goals of the South African Prime Minister, 
" Stoddart, "Sport, Culture and Postcolonial 
Relations", p. 126. 
56 Mcintyre, Colonies into Commonwealth, pp. 141-142. 
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James Hertzog. South Africa obtained national 
independence within the Commonwealth, and 'equality' with 
Britain.n The recognition of Afrikaans as an official 
language by the South African Party (SAP) was one of 
several factors in the formation of a coalition 
Government with National during 1933.~ Afrikaner-Anglo 
equality was symbolised by the adoption of the Afrikaans 
anthem, 'Die Stem' (The Voice), alongside 'God Save The 
King'. 59 Yet, Hertzog, despite his anti-imperialist 
reputation, was described by press correspondents at the 
1937 Imperial conference as one of the Empire's finest 
statesmen - although sometimes 'lacking in tact'.@ 
Despite achieving political equality with Britain, 
Afrikaner nationalist ideas took on a more extreme form. 
A 'Purified' National Party was established in 1934 from 
the Daniel Malan-led Cape branch of the National Party. 61 
Malan and his supporters opposed fusion with Smuts, were 
openly distrustful of Anglos, and supported South African 
secession from the Commonwealth. The National Party also 
received backing from the 'Broederbond', a secret 
organisation advocating an exclusive form of nationalism 
~ de Villiers, "Afrikaner Nationalism", p. 392. 
58 w. Beinart, Twentieth Century South Africa, 1994, 
pp. 111-112; de Villiers, p. 380. In 1934, National and 
the SAP amalgamated to form the 'United' South African 
National Party. 
9 Beinart, pp. 109-110. 
@ Press, 12 May 1937. 
O de Villiers, pp. 380-382. 
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based on Afrikaner 'baasskapp' {domination) .a 
Indicative of the growing support for Afrikaner 
nationalism, as defined by the National Party, was its 
immediate electoral impact. In the 1938 General Election, 
National gained 247,000 votes and 27 Parliamentary 
seats.fil Moreover, the Federation of Afrikaans Cultural 
Organisations {FAK), established in 1929, had over 300 
affiliated organisations by 1937. Linguistic and cultural 
groups represnted one-third of the FAK. The remainder 
consisted of religious, educational, science and youth 
organisations. 64 
The growth of Afrikaner nationalism within South 
African political, linguistic, and cultural spheres does 
not seem to have flowed through to the selection of the 
1937 Springboks. The team's ethnic composition was almost 
equally balanced between Anglos and Afrikaners. Most of 
the Anglos were backs and were from the coastal unions of 
Natal, Border and Western Province. 65 The Afrikaner 
players were concentrated in the forwards, with many from 
the Transvaal. As with preceding Springbok teams, a group 
of players {five) had either attended Stellenbosch 
University, or played for the Stellenbosch club.~ 
While South Africa loosened its imperial links with 
62 ibid. 
63 ibid. 
64 'b'd 398 l.l..,p .. 
65 Goodwin, Who's Who of International Rugby, passim. 
~ ibid. 
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Britain during the 1930s, imperialist attitudes were also 
less conspicuous in New Zealand. The First Labour 
Government (elected in 1935) was noted for its 
internationalist approach to external affairs. Hitherto, 
the Reform Party, which had governed at the time of the 
1921 and 1928 tours, was the epitome of overt 
Anglocentricism. 67 Labour's leader, the Australian-born 
Michael J. Savage, was perhaps the first New Zealand 
Prime Minister "to bring to his off ice a distinct lack of 
enthusiasm for the British monarchy. 1168 New Zealand was 
active within the League of Nations, and served on the 
League Council between 1936 and 1938. It opposed Britain 
on the issue of non-intervention in the Spanish Civil 
War, and was the only Commonwealth nation that did not 
recognise the Italian conquest of Abyssinia. 69 Labour, 
despite its internationalism, did not loosen imperial 
political links to the same extent of South Africa. New 
Zealand, for instance, failed to ratify the statute of 
Westminster until 1947.w 
The loosening of imperial political relations 
following the Balfour Declaration coincided with the 
commencement of the British Empire Games. Based on the 
model of the Olympic Games, the Empire Games surpassed 
67 Sinclair, History of New Zealand, pp. 246-247. 
68 M. McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: New 
Zealand in the World since 1935, 1993, p. 24. 
69 ibid., pp. 15-17; Sinclair, History of New 
Zealand, p. 277. 
70 Mcintyre, Colonies into Commonwealth, pp. 141-142. 
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rugby and cricket tours as the foremost imperial sporting 
event. 71 First held at Hamilton (Ontario), Canada, in 
1930, the Games attracted teams from Britain, the 
Dominions and two crown colonies, Bermuda and British 
~uiana. 72 Athletes of African descent competed for teams 
such as British Guiana. Thus, it was expected that Asians 
and West Indian athletes would compete at the 1934 Empire 
Games in Johannesburg.TI 
The prospect of Asian and West Indian competitors at 
the Johannesburg British Empire Games was in direct 
conflict with South Africa's segregationist ethos. Unlike 
the 1919 and 1928 New Zealand rugby teams, Empire Games 
teams were not prepared to exclude darker skinned 
athletes. At the inaugural meeting of the Empire Games 
Federation in 1932, delegates (led by the Canadians) 
argued that host countries must realise and accept that 
no place existed at the Games for racial 
discrimination. 74 Anticipating that the South Africans 
would object to Asian and West Indian participation 
71 R. Holt, Sport and the British, 1989, p. 224; 
Stoddart, "Sport, Culture and Postcolonial Relations", 
pp. 125-127. 
72 W. D. Mcintyre, The Significance of the 
Commonwealth, 1991, pp. 236-237; R. Palenski and T. 
Maddaford, The Games, 1983, p. 38. British teams competed 
at Empire (and Commonwealth) Games as England, Scotland, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland. 
73 The 1934 British Empire Games involved the teams 
which partipated at Hamilton in 1930, in addition to Hong 
Kong, India, Jamaica, Trinidad and Southern Rhodesia. 
74 Palenski and Maddaford, pp. 43, 53; Stoddart, 
"Sport, Culture and Postcolonial Relations", p. 127. 
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alongside white competitors, the Empire Garnes Federation 
took the 1934 Garnes from Johannesburg and awarded them to 
London.~ Moreover, the 1938 Empire Games at Sydney was 
tainted by racial controversy involving athletes from 
South Africa, Trinidad and Ceylon. A distance runner from 
Trinidad was physically assaulted by a South African at 
the team's quarters. 76 
As the British Empire Garnes replaced rugby and 
cricket as the principal vehicle of the sporting Empire, 
the 1937 tour was described by sporting commentators with 
less emphasis on imperial themes. The Christchurch Press, 
in an editorial, anticipated that the games would be 
played in 'the best spirit of rugby'. It added that New 
Zealanders were eager to repay the Springboks for the 
hospitality given to the 1928 All Blacks.n The dialogue 
at social events such as ci vie functions and teams 
dinners was also less imperialist than that of earlier 
tours. It usually centred on sporting themes, along with 
occasional references to the 'sportsmanlike' approach of 
the Springboks. 
Imperialist cliches, while less overt than during 
previous rugby tours, were not totally absent during the 
1937 tour. Before reaching New Zealand, the Springbok 
manager, Percy Day, remarked that an objective of the 
tour was to cement 'friendly relations' among 'Dominion 
75 ibid. 
76 Palenski and Maddaford, pp. 71-72. 
n Press, 1 May 1937. 
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cousins'. 78 At a Government reception honouring the 
Springboks, the Prime Minister, Michael Savage, spoke of 
his South African counterpart, James Hertzog, as one of 
the most 'lovable' of men. Symbolic tribute to the Empire 
was given as the Springboks laid a wreath at the 
Wellington citizens' War Memorial. They were accompanied 
by New Zealand and South African military veterans, 
former All Blacks, and various sporting administrators. 79 
The sporting public generally displayed less concern 
for the political context of the 1937 tour, and focused 
on its sporting aspect. Nonetheless, rugby followers 
apparently showed such great hospitality to the 
Springboks through social functions, that Percy Day, 
conscious that the main focus of the tour was sporting, 
requested their limitation.w Da~ repeated his praise of 
New Zealand generosity to the Springboks in his official 
post-tour review. He quoted the Wellington Dominion, when 
he referred to the 'nationwide enthusiasm' of New Zealand 
rugby followers for the Springboks. 81 
The 1937 Springbok tour of New Zealand, in 
comparison to previous rugby contacts between New Zealand 
and South Africa, was generally free of overt imperialist 
slogans and cultural controversy. The internationalist 
78 Press, 15 May 1937, 21 August 1937. 
79 Press, 7 August 1937. 
80 Press, 17 August 1937. 
81 Press, 6 January 1938. 
79 
outlook of New Zealand and South African politicians 
produced a social climate that was less conducive to 
imperial investment in rugby tours. Moreover, the British 
Empire Games had superseded rugby as the leading 
exhibition of the sporting Empire. Thus, the 1937 tour 
was usually described by New Zealand political and 
sporting commentators as a sporting event, without wider 
imperial importance. 
The prospect of cultural controversy between Maori 
and Springbok was averted during the 1937 tour - due to 
the 1936 Arawa memorial. It stimulated dialogue over the 
status of Maori within New Zealand and South African 
rugby contacts, through its proposal of a Maori boycott 
of the 1937 tour's sporting and social events. While it 
failed to gain unanimous approval, the Arawa memorial was 
supported by many Maori spokespeople. It achieved partial 
success, as a game between the Maori XV and Springboks 
was not scheduled. Maori rugby players, however, appeared 
for their provinces and the All Blacks. At times during 
the tour, several Springbok players spoke of South 
Africa's so-called 'native problem'. The sporting press 
failed (once again) to examine South African race 
relations. 
The immediate impact of the 1936 Arawa memorial was 
to obtain a SARB assurance that the Springboks would 
recognise Maori as their equals. The Arawa reminded the 
Springboks, in particular, of the inclusionist tradition 
of New Zealand sport and society. It remained to be seen, 
80 
however, if similar action from Maori would force the 
NZRFU into acknowledging the ethos of racial inclusion, 
by selecting Maori for future rugby tours of South 
Africa. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
The 1949 All Black Tour of South 
Africa: 
81 
'I am not going to acquiesce in any damned Afrikanders 
saying Maori cannot go ••• To hell with them.' 
(Sir Howard Kippenberger) 
The 1949 All Black rugby tour of South Africa, not 
unlike the 1928 tour, was dominated by the negation of 
Maori sporting rights . 1 The NZRFU insisted once again 
that it was in the best interests of Maori not to tour 
South Africa. Yet, in comparison to the general 
acquiescence to Maori exclusion from the 1928 tour, 
opposition to an 'all white' 1949 team was more 
widespread. The volume of Maori objections to New Zealand 
and South African rugby relations was similar to that 
preceding the 1937 Springbok tour, as it was nationwide. 
Maori rugby players and administrators publicly opposed 
their exclusion for the first time. Moreover, 
organisations such as trade unions led the emergence of 
Pakeha opposition to rugby contacts with South Africa. 
Maori and Pakeha protests stemmed from a number of 
perspectives. Some believed that the best All Black team, 
irrespective of cultural background, should tour South 
Africa. Others suggested that the team should drop the 
1 A proposed 1940 All Black tour of South Africa was 
cancelled due to the commencement of World War Two. 
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title of 'New Zealand All Blacks'. Vociferous protest 
notwithstanding, the majority of New Zealanders were 
silent over Maori exclusion. The imperial background of 
sporting relations between New Zealand and South Africa, 
however, was rarely mentioned by sporting commentators. 
Instead, they generally regarded the 1949 tour as a 
sporting event without wider political significance. 
The degree of opposition to Maori exclusion from the 
1949 tour of South Africa reflected a widespread post-war 
shift in New Zealand attitudes towards the status of 
Maori. World War Two was unquestionably a decisive factor 
towards re-shaping racial perceptions among Pakeha. The 
outbreak of hostilities resulted in many Maori volunteers 
for military service. The subsequent military reputation 
of the 28 (Maori) Battalion was interpreted by many 
Pakeha as confirmation of their equal citizenship. In 
contrast, limited pre-war objection to the negation of 
Maori sporting rights surfaced, when the All Blacks were 
scheduled to tour South Africa in 1940. With the 
commencement of World War Two in September 1939, the 1940 
tour was cancelled. 
Maori eligibility for the proposed 1940 All Black 
tour was initially ambiguous. A 1938 Maori rugby tour of 
Fiji, 2 organised by the NZRFU, was seen by some as a sign 
that Maori would be excluded from the 1940 tour. However, 
2 Swan, History of New Zealand Rugby Football: 
Volume One, pp. 247, 507. 
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the appearance of the Maori and All Black prop forward of 
1936-38, Everard Jackson, at the 1939 trials (to select 
the 1940 All Blacks) suggested that the NZRFU was 
considering Maori inclusion. After playing in the trial, 
Jackson was supposedly "told to go home ... because no 
Maoris could go to South Africa. 113 As the 1940 team was 
never chosen, the truth of Everard Jackson's eligibility 
remains unknown. 
The prospect of Maori exclusion from the proposed 
1940 tour produced limited debate within the sporting 
press. Many New Zealanders undoubtedly felt that the team 
selected would comply with sporting and social 
segregation, not unlike the 1928 All Blacks. That the 
NZRFU had imposed its own version of sporting segregation 
by excluding Maori from the proposed tour was asserted by 
few commentators. John Morgan, secretary of the 
Canterbury Maori Association, believed that the tour was 
the 'acid test' for the Rugby Union on Maori sporting 
rights. 4 Furthermore, Edward Cullen, Labour Party MP for 
Hawke's Bay, predicted that Maori exclusion from the All 
Blacks may encourage a Maori sporting exodus to rugby 
league. 5 
3 Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game, pp. 22-23. 
4 Press, 7 August 1939. 
5 Standard, 27 July 1939. Cullen was alluding to 
Maori representation in the 1939 New Zealand rugby league 
tour of England. Of the six Maori players who were chosen 
for the 1939 tour (cut short due to the beginning of 
World War Two), four had played provincial rugby union, 
including Hawea Mataira, a 1934 All Black. 
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The suggestion that New Zealand rugby administrators 
applied a 'colour bar' to All Black teams was met with 
indignation by local rugby personalities. Norman 
McKenzie, selector-coach of the 1920s Hawke's Bay 
Ranfurly Shield team, commented that several Maori were 
in the current Hawke's Bay team, 6 including two recent 
All Blacks, Everard Jackson and 'Tori' Reid. The 
Canterbury Rugby Union president, John Moloney, added 
that provincial rugby unions were 'proud' of their Maori 
players. 7 The significance of Maori exclusion from the 
1928 and proposed 1940 tours of South Africa, however, 
was overlooked by sporting commentators. Subsequently, 
the debate on sporting segregation against Maori 
subsided, due to the commencement of World War Two and 
ensuing cancellation of the 1940 tour. 
During the Second World War, several Maori visited 
South Africa, albeit within a military {rather than 
sporting) context. Between 1940 and 1941, the Maori 
Battalion visited Cape Town on two occasions. The first 
was in May 1940 while en-route to Britain, when the 
soldiers were advised by their superiors to expect a 
'cool' reception from white South Africans. If they were 
refused retail service or racially insulted, "they were 
not to make a fuss as it was the custom of the country. 118 
Not surprisingly, the soldiers were 'tight lipped and 
6 New Zealand Herald, 1 August 1939. 
7 Press, 2 August 1939. 
8 Gardiner, Te Mura o Te Ahi, pp. 37-38. 
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nervous', while at Cape Town. 9 However, during a second 
visit in February 1941, the Maori Battalion was advised 
by South African authorities that they would be treated 
"in exactly the same manner as any other British 
Soldiers. 1110 As the Maori Battalion was apparently free 
of white South African hostility, the prospect emerged 
that Maori All Blacks would receive a similar welcome 
within South Africa. 
The hope that Maori All Blacks would tour South 
Africa was promoted not only by the Maori Battalion, but 
also the re-shaping of post-war racial perceptions 
throughout the Western world. The defeat of Nazi Germany 
was met with change in attitudes for many people, where 
social darwinist ideas of 'superior' and 'inferior' races 
lost much of their credibility. The end of World War Two 
also marked the beginning of European decolonisation in 
Asia, and the emerging black American push for full human 
rights. Yet, whether South Africa would acknowledge the 
changing racial perceptions of New Zealand and the world 
by accepting Maori rugby players as equals remained to be 
seen. 
An indication that the NZRFU was considering Maori 
players for the 1949 tour of South Africa (scheduled 
initially for 1948) came from one of its executive 
member, James Prendeville. At a post-match function 




remarked that the best available All Black team would 
tour South Africa, irrespective of the colour bar. His 
assertion was supported by the Australian and opposing 
Taranaki-King Country players at the function. 11 
As the prospect of Maori All Blacks touring South 
Africa was raised in New Zealand, the reaction from 
Afrikaner commentators was immediate and hostile. The 
Afrikaans-language newspaper, Die Vaderland, ran a front 
page heading, "No Colour Bar in Composition of Rugby 
Team" . 12 Die Transvaaler (Johannesburg) published an 
article entitled "Politics in International Rugby", and 
remarked that an All Black team which included Maori 
would be unacceptable in South Africa.u It also alerted 
the SARB that the NZRFU intended to use rugby for 
'political propaganda' by selecting Maori All Blacks . 14 
The idea that Maori rugby players would provoke a racial 
crisis for white South Africans was reiterated by 
Professor H. B. Davel, president of the Northern 
Transvaal Rugby Union. He mentioned that South Africa 
could do without 'non-European' rugby players from other 
countries exacerbating the 'colour question'." 
Despite Afrikaner hostility to the possible 
inclusion of Maori on the 1949 tour, a number of South 
11 Press, 28 August 1946. 
12 ibid. 
13 Press, 29 August 1946. 
14 ibid. 
15 Press, 30 August 1946. 
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African rugby players were eager to host Maori All 
Blacks. They referred to the military reputation of Maori 
during World War Two, and also mentioned that Maori and 
white South Africans fought alongside each other. 
Moreover, South African supporters of Maori inclusion 
alluded to Maori servicemen as 'grand sportsmen' who 
exhibited modest behaviour and 'impeccable manners' . 16 A 
former Springbok, Dr. Louis Babrow, recalled that Maori 
soldiers saved 'many young South African lives' at Sidi 
Rezegh (North Africa) during 1941. He also commented that 
the 1937 Springbok team (including himself) that toured 
New Zealand had accepted Maori hospitality, and were 
happy to play against Maori.n 
The question of Maori sporting rights within South 
Africa, for the first time, transcended New Zealand and 
South African boundaries. In the United Kingdom, the 
Manchester Guardian described the opinions of Die 
Transvaaler as "the latest bit of grit to be thrown in 
the wheels of international sportsmanship. 1118 It welcomed 
the news that a number of South African sporting 
identities supported equality of sporting rights for 
Maori and Pakeha in South Africa. The Manchester Guardian 
also anticipated an emphatic New Zealand response against 
a racially exclusive All Black team, in recognition of 
16 Press, 29 August 1946, 30 August 1946. 
17 Press, 30 August 1946. 
18 ibid. 
88 
Maori sporting and wartime service . 19 
As support for Maori inclusion on the 1949 tour was 
received from overseas sporting commentators, the NZRFU 
adopted an ambiguous position. Its chairman, Stan Dean, 
stated that Maori would be considered for selection, only 
if the SARB assured the NZRFU that they would be welcomed 
as equals. He recalled that the Rugby Union had 
considered including Maori players on the 1928 All Black 
tour of South Africa.w At the time, it felt that the 
exclusion of Maori was in their best interests. 21 
However, the Maori Battalion's wartime presence in South 
Africa indicated that Maori rugby players no longer 
needed 'protection' from white South African racism. 
The social repercussions of Maori All Blacks in 
South Africa was raised by South African-based New 
Zealanders in the sporting press. Many believed that 
Maori players would be accepted by white South Africans 
only within a strictly sporting capacity. On the other 
hand, their presence at obligatory social events such as 
dinners and dances would cause 'a major problem'.n In 
particular, Maori, when unaccompanied by Pakeha All 
Blacks, would be refused entry into hotels, restaurants 
19 ibid. 
20 Press, 3 September 1946. 
21 ibid. 
22 Press, 7 January 194 7. Undoubtedly, a great fear 
of white South Africans was the prospect of social 
contact between Maori All Blacks and white women at 
social functions such as dances. 
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and other public areas designated as 'white'. Expatriate 
New Zealanders in South Africa also mentioned that Maori 
players were targets for racist insults from local 
bigots,n in spite of the wartime acceptance of the Maori 
Battalion. 
The possibility of Maori inclusion on the 1949 tour 
weakened with the announcement of a 1948 Maori rugby tour 
of Fiji.~ It appeared likely that Maori players would be 
excluded once again from South Africa. The 1948 tour of 
Fiji was dismissed by the Labour Party newspaper, the 
Standard, as a 'palliative' to prepare Maori for their 
exclusion from the 1949 tour.~ It accused the NZRFU of 
repressing discussion over Maori eligibility through its 
own 'iron curtain' • 26 The Standard, moreover, placed 
Maori exclusion within a south African political context. 
It depicted the South African Prime Minister, Daniel 
Malan, as a 'champion of the colour bar', who would 
certainly support the idea of Maori exclusion from South 
Africa. 27 
The Standard continued to be the most vociferous of 
New Zealand newspapers on the theme of Maori sporting 
rights in South Africa. Its inference that the 1948 tour 
of Fiji was arranged to pacify Maori following their 
23 Press, 14 February 194 7. 
~ Press, 1 March 1947, 8 August 1947. 




exclusion from the 1949 tour was reinforced when a 1949 
Maori tour of Australia was scheduled. 28 Maori exclusion 
was confirmed when the NZRFU stated that only players 
'wholly of European blood' would be chosen for the 1949 
tour. 29 According to the Rugby Union, its decision was 
made in the presence of the Maori Advisory Board 
secretary, Kingi Tahiwi, and was in accordance with Maori 
Advisory Board opinion. 30 The NZRFU, by insisting that it 
had to respect south African racial customs, neglected 
once again the inclusionist tradition of New Zealand 
sport and society. 
The NZRFU decision to exclude Maori from the 1949 
tour immediately raised critical questions from the 
sporting press. Had it ever discussed Maori eligibility 
with the SARB? If so, what was the South African 
position? And, if not, why had the Rugby Union failed to 
raise the issue of Maori inclusion? However, the NZRFU 
chairman, Alan st. Clair Belcher (who had replaced Stan 
Dean in 1947), would not answer any questions on Maori 
eligibility. 31 
The manner that the NZRFU arrived at its decision to 
exclude Maori from the 1949 tour was condemned 
immemdiately by Ned Parata, the unofficial elder 
statesman of Maori rugby. Parata, who was the Maori 
28 Press, 6 August 1948. 
29 ibid. 
30 ibid. 
31 Press, 7 August 1948. 
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Advisory Board chairman until 1926, was made a NZRFU life 
member in 1943. In a telegram to the NZRFU, he failed to 
denounce Maori exclusion explicitly, yet condemned the 
NZRFU for its decision without consulting Maori rugby 
administrators: 
Strongly protest action your council regarding 
Maoris for South African tour ... Your council has 
deliberately failed in its duty to discuss matter 
with Maori Advisory Board who are representatives of 
all Maori players and our Maori people.n 
The Maori Advisory Board, Parata claimed, had never 
even discussed Maori participation in the 1949 tour. He 
concluded that any comment from Kingi Tahiwi 'could only 
be his own personal opinion'.n 
Many past and present Maori rugby players spoke out 
for the first time against their exclusion from the 1949 
tour. Hitherto, their exclusion from the 1928 tour failed 
to produce opposition from Maori rugby spokespeople. The 
Taupo Rugby Sub-Union president (and former New Zealand 
Maori player), Arthur Grace, suggested that the 1949 team 
should drop the title 'All Blacks'. Maori exclusion would 
encourage many, he added, to convert to rugby league.~ 
The 1948 New Zealand Maori captain, Johnny smith, wanted 
the 1949 team to amend the title of 'All Blacks' to 'New 
Zealand European All Blacks'. 35 Smith, an All Black 
32 Press, 9 August 1948. 
33 ibid. 
~ Standard, 7 October 1948. 
~ Standard, 2 September 1948. 
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centre three-quarter in 1946 and 1947, was regarded by 
many commentators as 'one of New Zealand's greatest mid-
field backs'. 36 
Contemporary Maori political figures, like their 
sporting peers, entered into dialogue on the negation of 
their sporting rights for the first time. The MP for 
Northern Maori, Tapihana Paikea, also wanted the All 
Blacks renamed; his preferred title was the 'New Zealand 
European team'. Paikea told the New Zealand House of 
Representatives that the 1947 All Black halfback, Vince 
Bevan, was 'penalised both ways' . 37 Bevan was excluded 
from the 1949 tour and 1948 Maori rugby tour of Fiji. He 
apparently had 'too little Maori blood' to be eligible 
for Maori teams, 38 yet too much for South African tastes. 
The discrepancy over the status of Maori soldiers 
and rugby players in South Africa was raised by both 
Apirana Ngata (no longer active in Parliamentary 
politics), and Eruera Tirikatene, MP for Southern Maori. 
Ngata recalled that the Maori Battalion had received the 
same hospitality as Pakeha soldiers in Cape Town during 
World War Two. Maori All Blacks, in comparison, were 
unwelcome in South Africa. Nga ta also stressed that 
Pakeha politicians, unlike Maori, were silent over Maori 
36 Chester and McMillan, Encyclopedia, p. 183. 
37 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol. 282 
(1948), p. 2189. 
38 standard, 23 September 1948. 
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exclusion.~ Tirikatene remarked that 'all rugby-loving 
Maori former Servicemen' would expect the 1949 team to 
travel without the title 'New Zealand All Blacks'. He 
believed, like Ned Para ta, that the NZRFU' s decision 
without Maori consultation was an insult to Maori. 40 
Whereas Maori indignation at their exclusion from 
the 1949 tour was eloquent and often outspoken, it was 
usually restricted to sporting and political 
spokespeople. However, Pakeha objection to sporting 
segregation, despite its initial silence (with the 
exception of the standard), escalated following the 
NZRFU's decision to exclude Maori. The Christchurch 
Press, in an editorial, was 'disturbed' by Ned Parata's 
revelation that the NZRFU and Maori Advisory Board had 
not even discussed Maori eligibility. 41 It remarked that 
it may be wiser to cancel the 1949 tour, rather than 
jeopardise the 'happy relationship' between Maori and 
Pakeha. 42 Previously, the Press viewed Maori exclusion 
from the 1928 tour as necessary for their 'protection'. 
On the other hand, it emphasised the importance of local 
race relations ahead of rugby contacts with South Africa 
before the 1937 Springbok tour. 
The correlation between Maori exclusion and New 
Zealand rugby success against South Africa was emphasised 
39 Press, 7 September 1948. 
40 Press, 2 September 1948. 
41 Press, 11 August 1948. 
42 ibid. 
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by the sporting press before the 1949 tour, not unlike 
that preceding the 1928 tour. It had previously 
considered the exclusion of George Nepia and Jimmy Mill 
from the 1928 tour as a 'fullback and halfback problem'. 
Likewise, the Standard, in a leading article, lamented 
Maori absence from the 1949 tour. It regarded the 
exclusion of Vince Bevan and Johnny Smith, in particular, 
as a selectorial nightmare. 43 Peter Smith (brother of 
Johnny Smith) and 'Ben' Couch were two Maori All Blacks 
who were also ineligible for the 1949 tour. Ben Couch was 
subsequently the National Government's Minister of Police 
and Maori Affairs during the 1981 Springbok tour of New 
Zealand. He achieved notoriety in a television interview, 
when he appeared to 'support' apartheid in South 
Africa. 44 
The increased promotion of Maori sporting rights 
from the sporting press was followed by similar backing 
from representatives of war veterans' groups and trade 
unions. Perhaps the most acclaimed Pakeha denunciation of 
Maori exclusion from the 1949 tour was from Major-General 
Sir Howard Kippenberger, Dominion President of the 
Returned Services' Association (RSA). An officer in the 
New Zealand Army during World War Two, Kippenberger 
ranked alongside Bernard Freyberg and Charles Upham as a 
43 standard, 19 August 1948. 
44 R. Shears and I. Gidley, Storm out of Africa, 
1981, pp. 33-34. 
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New Zealand war hero. 45 At a September 1948 Christchurch 
RSA meeting, he stated that he would protest personally 
to the NZRFU against Maori exclusion. Kippenberger 
remarked, in forthright manner: "I am not going to 
acquiesce in any damned Afrikanders (sic] saying (Maori] 
cannot go .•. To hell with them. " 46 He also paid tribute to 
Maori Battalion military service, and claimed that the 
RSA was the only organisation supporting the 'rights of 
equality' for Maori. 47 
The RSA, in spite of Kippenberger's assertion, was 
not the only veterans' organisation that supported Maori 
equality of sporting rights. The Wellington branch 
seretary of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force 
(servicemens') Association, R. Childs, predicted that 
members throughout New Zealand 'would emphatically 
support' demands that the 1949 team discard the title of 
'New Zealand All Blacks'." He mentioned the 'splendid' 
military reputation of Maori, and considered their 
exclusion from the 1949 tour as a national insult. He 
also suggested a nationwide protest against the 
enforcement of South African racial policies 'down the 
45 Phillips, A Man's Country? pp. 202-205. 
46 Press, 2 September 1948. 
47 ibid. 
48 Press, 3 September 1948. The various branches of 
the Armed Forces often formed their own veterans' groups 
following World War Two. The members of these groups were 
also members of the RSA. 
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throats' of New Zealanders.• 
New Zealand trade unions, for the first time, 
questioned the morality of New Zealand and South African 
sporting relations. Union condemnation of Maori 
exclusion, moreover, pre-dated the more celebrated 
protest from Kippenberger. At a stop-work meeting during 
August 1948, the Wellington Waterside Workers' Union 
urged the cancellation of the 1949 tour, due to the 
exclusion of Maori. The Watersiders' union, which 
included many Maori, considered the NZRFU' s decision 
'completely undemocratic', an insult to Maori and 
contrary to the inclusionist tradition of New Zealand 
society. 50 Thus, according to the Watersiders' , the 
selection of the 1949 team represented an attack on a 
'national principle'. 51 
Trade union condemnation of Maori exclusion surfaced 
on a national basis following the publication of 
Kippenberger's protest. The Federation of Labour's 
national executive resolved that the 1949 All Black team 
was unrepresentative of New Zealand society.il Several 
Union officials were eager to persuade individual All 
Blacks to stand down from the 1949 tour, 53 although 
whether they succeeded remains obscure. The national 
49 ibid. 
so Press, 13 August 1948. 
Sl ibid. 
52 Press, 7 September 1948. 
53 Press, 8 September 1948. 
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secretary of the Watersider Workers' Union, Toby Hill, 
claimed that Kippenberger gave 'the green light' to union 
consideration on whether to provide transportation for 
the 1949 tour.~ Furthermore, the Otago Trades Council 
was 'disgusted' at 'the subservient action' of the NZRFU 
in excluding Maori. Like a number of Maori politicians, 
it opposed the use of the title 'All Blacks' by the 1949 
team. 55 
Coinciding with trade union and war veterans 
opposition to Maori exclusion from the 1949 tour, the 
negation of Maori sporting rights was vigorously 
condemned by newspaper correspondents. The majority of 
letter writers alluded to the inclusionist ethos of New 
Zealand society, including the military service of Maori. 
A letter published in the Christchurch Press during 
August 1948 from Varian J. Wilson reflected the 
sentiments of many correspondents. Wilson believed that 
the NZRFU decision to exclude Maori had 'aided and 
abetted the racialism of the South Africans'. 56 He 
mentioned that the 'Springboks' had a high opinion of the 
Maori Battalion. A Maori RNZAF sergeant, for instance, 
was treated with courtesy and respect, while in Durban. 
He also remarked that several 'extreme racialists' had 
conceded that their eyes were 'opened' through contact 
~ Press, 3 September 1948. 
55 Press, 8 September 1948. 
56 Press, 9 August 1948. 
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with Maori. 57 
A limited number of correspondents, usually South 
Africans, or New Zealanders who had visited South Africa, 
supported Maori exclusion. The common theme of their 
argument was the prospect of white hostility towards 
Maori.~ This was alluded to by Eric 'Fritz' Snow, a 1928 
All Black to South Africa. He contended that white South 
Africans were oblivious to the notion of racial 
equality,~ and would treat Maori in the way that they 
treated black South Africans. Likewise, the editor of the 
Rugby Almanack of New Zealand and member of the 1924 
'Invincibles', 'Read' Masters, 60 claimed to speak for the 
majority of rugby players when he accused opponents of 
Maori exclusion of 'irresponsible meddling'. 0 
South African rugby officials and the Afrikaner 
nationalist press continued its crusade for sporting 
segregation. Andries Pienaar, president of the SARB since 
1927,~ dismissed New Zealand protests against Maori 
exclusion as originating from 'people in the pavilion and 
on the rope'. 63 Die Transvaaler claimed that Kippenberger 
57 ibid. 
58 Press, 25 August 1948, 23 September 1948. 
59 Press, 4 September 1948. 
00 See Chester and McMillan, Encyclopedia, p. 138. 
61 Press, 9 September 1948. 
62 Dictionary of South African Biography, Vol. IV, p. 
457. Pienaar was president of the South African Cricket 
Association during 1947 and 1948. 
63 Press, 4 September 1948. 
99 
had insulted the majority of white South Africans with 
his 'damned Afrikanders' quip.M Die Burger (Cape Town) 
accused 'the Kippenbergers of New Zealand' of forcing 
their racial beliefs on South Africa. An All Black team 
containing Maori, according to Die Burger, would be used 
by 'communists' for political purposes. 65 The English-
language Cape Times regretted that 'well-meaning' New 
Zealanders sought racial controversy over Maori 
exclusion. Its terse response to the idea of Maori All 
Blacks in South Africa was that 'Europeans and non-
Europeans' do not 'mingle' in South African sport. 66 
The NZRFU confirmed its decision to exclude Maori 
players from the 1949 tour at a meeting with the Maori 
Advisory Board in October 1948. It stated that the Maori 
Advisory Board gave its unanimous support to the Rugby 
Union in a resolution signed by Ned Parata (despite his 
earlier indignation) and Kingi Tahiwi. 67 The Maori 
Advisory Board resolution, according to the NZRFU, had 
reaffirmed its decision before the 1928 tour of South 
Africa (with 'unanimous' yet unreported approval from 
Maori elders) to recommend the exclusion of Maori from 
rugby tours of South Africa.~ 
M Press, 8 September 1948. Kippenberger conceded 
that his 'damned Afrikanders' quip was 'quite improper'. 
65 ibid. 
66 ibid. 
67 Press, 2 October 1948. 
68 ibid. 
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The majority of New Zealanders continued to view New 
Zealand and South African rugby relations separately from 
wider political and social factors. Furthermore, with 
news of the Maori Advisory Board's support for Maori 
exclusion, the sporting press reverted to portraying the 
1949 tour as merely a sporting event. Criticism of 
sporting segregation became diluted, or on occasions, was 
reversed. The Christchurch Press, in a rugby-dominated 
editorial, considered Maori exclusion as 'realistic 
though distasteful'. 69 At the state farewell of the 1949 
team, the Prime Minister, Peter Fraser 'regretted' the 
ommission of Maori. 70 Eruera Tirikatene disclaimed his 
earlier view that the All Blacks without Maori was 'an 
insult'. Instead, he depicted the players as ambassadors 
of 'the Maori people'. 71 
New Zealand indignation over Maori exclusion from 
the 1949 tour failed, once again, to address the broader 
question of racial discrimination against black South 
Africans. While the 1949 tour coincided with the 
inception of apartheid, black-white inequalities were 
rarely mentioned by sporting commentators. The main goal 
of the All Blacks, like their 1928 predecessors, was 
sporting instead of political. However, the . players 
observed the outbreak of inter-racial violence at Port 
Elisabeth during the match against Eastern Province. Play 
69 Press, 4 October 1948. 
70 Press, 12 April 1949. 
71 ibid. 
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was stopped on two occasions and several people 
hospitalised, due to fighting between white and 
'Coloured' rugby followers. 72 As the Eastern Province 
game was the only reported instance of racial controversy 
surrounding the All Blacks, the sporting press resumed 
its rugby-centred coverage of the tour. 
The debate over Maori sporting rights preceding the 
1949 All Black tour overshadowed the idea that New 
Zealand and South African rugby contacts were imperialist 
occasions. Sporting and political commentators viewed the 
1949 tour simply as a sporting event, without resorting 
to imperialist platitudes. That the political context of 
New Zealand and South Africa was often averse to 
imperialism, reflected the absence of its investment in 
rugby. South African politics, in particular, became 
increasingly nationalist following World War Two, and was 
a factor in the decline of Jan Smuts, almost certainly 
South Africa's most imperial-minded Prime Minister. 73 
The National Party victory at the 1948 South African 
Election represented the political triumph of Afrikaner 
nationalism. It subsequently gained notoriety through the 
introduction of an extreme form of racial segregation 
72 Press, 13 June 1949. 
73 L. Thompson, History of South Africa, p. 162. Jan 
Smuts was influential in South Africa's decision to 
support Britain at the beginning of World War Two. He 
consequently became Prime Minister of the United 
Government, after James Hertzog's resignation. 
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known as apartheid (apartness).~ Within the political 
context of post-war Afrikaner nationalism, Springbok test 
and touring teams became dominated by Afrikaners. In 
later years, the Anglo South African writer (and renowned 
political fugitive), Donald Woods, argued that the 
Afrikaner secret society, the 'Broederbond', believed 
that Springbok rugby was 'insufficiently Afrikaans'. 75 
Out of 24 Springbok representatives during the 1949 test 
series, 20 (83%) were Afrikaner. Furthermore, almost 50% 
of the Afrikaner Springboks were from the Afrikaner-
dominated Transvaal, orange Free State and Northern 
Transvaal Rugby Unions. 76 
Despite the alleged Broederbond influence on 
Springbok rugby, Felix du Plessis, reported to be a 
supporter of the opposition United Party, captained the 
1949 Springboks. Under his leadership, South Africa 
achieved an unassailable 3-0 lead going into the fourth 
test match. However, du Plessis, despite his high 
standard of play and leadership, was not chosen for the 
final test team. Subsequently, Donald Woods contended 
that the Broederbond was the rumoured force behind du 
Plessis' non-selection.TI That he was replaced as 
Springbok captain by an Anglo, Basil Kenyon, indicated 
~ ibid., p. 186. The term 'apartheid' was coined by 
Afrikaner intellectuals during the 1930s. 
75 Woods, Black and White, pp. 42-43, 45. 
76 Goodwin, Who's Who of International Rugby, passim. 
TI Woods, p. 45. 
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that Broederbond influence of Springbok selection policy 
seemed unlikely. 
The context of Afrikaner nationalism ensured the 
withering of imperialist slogans from South African 
commentators during the 1949 tour. A civic function held 
following the team's arrival at Cape Town on 10 May 1949, 
attracted the hierarchy of the SARB and National 
Government, including the Prime Minister, Daniel Malan. 
The focus of discussion at the Cape Town function was the 
resumption of New Zealand and South African rugby 
rivalry, rather than Empire loyalty and co-operation. 78 
The only reference to the sporting Empire was the 
addition of a post-tour match between the All Blacks and 
a western Province Town xv. The receipts from the game 
were set aside as travelling funds for South African 
sports team to compete at the 1950 British Empire Games 
in Auckland. 79 
New Zealand political and sporting commentators, 
like their South African counterparts, usually viewed the 
1949 tour as an essentially sporting event. On occasions, 
the tour was placed within an internationalist setting. 80 
Despite the opposition National Party's apparent 
78 Press, 11 May 1949, 12 May 1949. 
79 Press, 20 September 1949. 
80 McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy, pp. 57-
58, 61. New Zealand was a charter member of the United 
Nations (UN) following its 1945 inception. Moreover, the 
Prime Minister, Peter Fraser, was a firm supporter of 
internationlist concepts such as the UN and universal 
collective security. 
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cornmittment to the British Empire, 81 its acting leader, 
Keith Holyoake, described the All Blacks as 'ambassadors 
and emissaries'. 82 Imperialist slogans remained absent 
from politicians and sporting administrators following 
the All Blacks' return to New Zealand. At a Parliamentary 
reception, both Peter Fraser and the leader of the 
National Party, 'Sid' Holland referred to the players' 
sportsmanship. The All Blacks, despite a 0-4 test series 
'whitewash', were described as 'true sportsmen and New 
Zealanders' . 83 
The 1949 All Black tour of South Africa was usually 
portrayed by New Zealand and South African commentators 
as a sporting occasion without wider political 
significance. Neither imperialism nor internationalism 
were recurring themes of discussion during the 1949 tour. 
Racial factors, on the other hand, dominated the 
selection of the All Blacks. Maori players were initially 
hopeful that they would be considered for selection, yet 
were once again excluded. In contrast to the 1928 and 
cancelled 1940 tours, a vocal minority of New Zealanders 
- Maori and Pakeha - publicly supported the selection of 
the best team, irrespective of colour. However, the 
81 ibid., pp. 26, 59. National believed Labour's 
internationalism was disloyal to Britain and the 
Commonwealth. It was suspicious of international 
organisations such as the League of Nations and its 
successor, the United Nations. 
82 Press, 12 April 1949. 
83 Press, 15 October 1949. 
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majority view within New Zealand was that the 1949 All 
Blacks respect South African social and sporting 
segregation. Like previous tours, the 1949 tour did not 
arouse public criticism of racial segregation - which by 
1949 was referred to as apartheid. 
Although the 1949 tour represented a continuation of 
New Zealand and South African rugby relations, the 
cultural cost of such exchanges had generated increased 
public indignation. The NZRFU was thus faced with a 
decision on the future of its contacts with South African 
rugby. It could continue with the status quo of Maori 
exclusion, and provoke greater public opposition. on the 
other hand, it could insist that the SARB accept Maori 
rugby players on future tours to South Africa, despite 
sporting and social segregation. Maori All Blacks in 
South Africa did not become a reality until 1970, when 
three part-Maori and one part-Samoan were chosen as All 
Black tourists. By this date, many New Zealanders were 
opposed to sporting contacts with South Africa. Their 
opposition now rested on the wider issue of New Zealand's 
sporting association with apartheid. 
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CONCLUSION 
The published literature which recounts rugby 
football contacts between New Zealand and South Africa to 
1950 has undoubtedly constructed a narrow depiction of 
such sporting relations. It was consisted typically of 
newspapers, books and diaries. The authors have in the 
main been sports journalists, rugby administrators and 
former players. Their objectives have been to produce a 
narrative of sporting contests. Histories of this kind 
simply provide a sports-oriented chronicle of players, 
games, and tours between 1921 and 1949. The wider social 
and political context of New Zealand and South African 
rugby relations is ignored, or at best, marginalised. 
They collectively encouraged the classic sophism among 
the New Zealand public that 'sport and politics do not 
mix'. Sophistry aside, it is impossible for sport to 
exist outside of wider society, and New Zealand rugby is 
not exempt from political and social influence. In 
particular, rugby contacts between New Zealand and South 
Africa to 1950 illuminate two distinct social themes -
sporting imperialism on the one hand, and race relations 
on the other. 
Racial attitudes throughout New Zealand and South 
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African rugby relations to 1950 generally reflected the 
social darwinist notion of 'superior' and 'inferior' 
races, which was predominant throughout the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During this 
period, rugby, although a 'white' sport, produced 
divergent patterns of racial participation in New Zealand 
and South Africa. In South Africa, black (African and 
'Coloured') rugby was segregated from the white game, and 
thus reflected racial segregation throughout wider 
society. Black rugby players could perform with and 
against each other, but not with nor against white 
players. Moreover, segregation was implicitly condoned by 
New Zealand and British sporting administrations, through 
their relations with South African rugby. From 1891, 
'official' South African rugby (and other sports) teams 
competing within the imperial sporting network 
represented only white South Africa. Attempts by black 
sports teams to play overseas, such as the 1911 proposal 
for a South African 'Coloured' rugby tour of New Zealand 
(during 1912), were rejected by Dominion sporting bodies. 
New Zealand rugby was similar to the South African 
game in that it also mirrored the society that it was 
part of. New Zealand society generally viewed itself as 
inclusionist, although some commentators may well suggest 
'assimilationist' as a more fitting portray!. Yet, unlike 
South African rugby, the New Zealand game reflected the 
inclusionist ethos of wider society. Maori usually played 
alongside and against Pakeha rugby players at club and 
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provincial level. They were also a salient feature of New 
Zealand national teams. The visible success of Maori on 
the playing field vis-a-vis wider New Zealand society 
undoubtedly fuelled cliches which celebrated racial 
'equality' between Maori and Pakeha. Maori rugby prowess 
was a sign of their inclusion into Pakeha sporting 
culture. Their inclusion into wider New Zealand society, 
however, was often limited due to their socio-economic 
distance from Pakeha. 
The emergence of rugby contacts between New Zealand 
and South Africa raised a number of racial issues which, 
with the benefit of hindsight, were inadequately resolved 
by the NZRFU and SARB. By rejecting the proposed 1912 
'Coloured' rugby tour of New Zealand, the NZRFU 
simultaneously acknowledged the 'official' status of the 
white SARB. For the next eighty years, the Rugby Union 
recognised only SARB teams, and thus, cultivated links 
with an overtly racist sporting adminstration. Black 
South African rugby players were denied the opportunity 
of touring outside South Africa, and playing against 
teams that were racially inclusive. Had the 1912 
'Coloured' tour materialised, the players would have 
almost certainly noted the inclusionist ethos of New 
Zealand sport and society. The tour's cancellation thus 
ensured that black rugby players were denied the 
opportunity to transplant the notion of racially 
inclusive sport to a South African context. 
The selection of racially exclusive South African 
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rugby teams was generally accepted by New Zealand society 
up to, and beyond 1950. The absence of black Springboks 
was never discussed publicly within rugby, political or 
press circles. Sporting commentators unquestionably held 
the opinion that racial segregation in South African 
sport and society was only that country's concern. On the 
other hand, a number of Maori and Pakeha spokespeople 
condemned the application of South African racial beliefs 
towards Maori rugby players. Local criticism of the South 
African 'colour line' within a New Zealand (but not South 
African) context, nonetheless reflected the equally 
social darwinist view of Maori racial 'superiority' over 
black South African. 
The most obvious illustration of social darwinist 
ideas in relation to New Zealand and South African rugby 
contacts took place during the 1921 Springbok tour of New 
Zealand. The 1921 tour was infamous for the Blackett 
cablegram, which echoed the racial beliefs of most white 
South Africans. It was denounced for its portray! of the 
New Zealand Maori XV as a 'band of coloured men'. New 
Zealand commentators - Maori and Pakeha - shared the 
white South African belief that black South Africans were 
racially 'inferior'. Maori, however, were ostensibly 
regarded by Pakeha as 'equal' . Through their social 
darwinist views, critics of the Blackett cablegram such 
as Te Rangi Hiroa ultimately displayed selective 
morality. Despite the apparent racial double standards of 
Maori and Pakeha commentators opposed to segregation, 
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Blackett's slur against the Maori XV was not condemned by 
the players themeselves, nor by wider Maori society. 
Racial hypocrisy within New Zealand was evident 
before, and during the 1937 Springbok rugby tour of New 
Zealand. The absence of black Springboks, in addition to 
racial inequality within South Africa, was once again 
overlooked by sporting commentators. Instead, the fear 
that white South African racism would appear during the 
1937 tour instigated protests from Maori individuals and 
iwi. Their concerns were encapsulated through a memorial 
from the Arawa confederation to the NZRFU. It threatened 
a Maori boycott of games and social occasions such as hui 
involving the 1937 Springboks, to avoid racial insult. 
Yet, a minority of Maori (amplified by the sporting 
press) felt that they should demonstrate sporting and 
social inclusion to the Springboks. Consequently, the 
Arawa memorial had a mixed effect, as Maori appeared for 
their provinces (and the All Blacks) against the 
Springboks. The South Africans respected the equal 
citizenship of Maori and Pakeha, and attended a Rotorua 
hui (in similar manner to other overseas guests). 
The Arawa memorial almost certainly inspired the 
initial appearance of white South African opposition to 
sporting segregation in relation to New Zealand and South 
African rugby exchanges. It originated from Anglo South 
African and expatriate New Zealand commentators, and 
attempted to juxtapose segregation with Afrikaner racial 
bigotry. Indeed, during the 1937 Springbok tour, 
111 
Afrikaner players admitted to social darwinist attitudes. 
They felt that white perceptions of racial superiority to 
black South Africans were 'natural', yet dismissed 
similar comparisons between Maori and black South 
Africans. 
Maori rugby players, while recognised by white South 
Africans as equal within New Zealand, were classified as 
'Coloured' under South African sporting and social 
custom. The negation of their sporting rights represented 
the greatest example of racial double standards within 
New Zealand and South African rugby relations to, and 
beyond 1950. It remains unclear whether the decision to 
exclude Maori players was made by the SARB and NZRFU in 
conjunction, or by the NZRFU acting alone. Paternalist 
factors were put forward by rugby administrators in 
excluding Maori. It feared that Maori players would be 
humiliated by segregationist laws and customs, in 
addition to racist abuse from white South Africans. It 
also believed that the All Blacks were duty-bound to 
respect South Africa's segregationist ethos, in the same 
manner that Springbok teams respected New Zealand's 
inclusionist tradition. 
Maori exclusion from the 1928 and 1949 tours had 
immediate sporting and social consequences. The absence 
of several outstanding Maori All Blacks ( including George 
Nepia, one of the 'greats' of New Zealand rugby) may have 
cost test series victories for the 1928 and 1949 All 
Blacks. Moreover, the inclusionist custom of New Zealand 
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sport was sacrificed by the NZRFU to enable the tours to 
proceed. However, Maori exclusion from the 1928 tour 
failed to arouse widespread protest from the sporting 
press. Instead, commentators merely bemoaned the lack of 
quality players to replace Maori All Blacks such as 
George Nepia and Jimmy Mill. The only examples of dissent 
that alluded to the wider moral issue of Maori exclusion 
were from the Labour Mayor of Christchurch, John Archer, 
and the Akarana Maori Association. 
The exclusion of Maori players from the 1949 tour 
generated much greater protest from New Zealanders, than 
that surrounding the 1928 tour. Events during, and after 
World War Two contributed to increased opposition to 
sporting segregation. New Zealanders recognised 
similarities between the defeated Nazi regime, and South 
Africa's Afrikaner Nationalist Government (elected in 
1948). Many Maori had fought in the Second World War, 
which, from a Pakeha perspective, entrenched the equal 
status between the two. More specifically, the Maori 
Battalion had visited South Africa twice and were 
received no differently to other Allied soldiers by white 
South Africans. Hence, the NZRFU had apparently little 
reason to 'protect' Maori players from the racist 
excesses of South African society. 
A feature of New Zealand opposition to Maori 
exclusion from the 1949 tour was that from war veterans' 
organisations and trade unions. Implicit in such protests 
was the adage that the inclusionist ethos imbued all 
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aspects of New Zealand society. However, political 
condemnation to Maori exclusion was generally absent, 
with the exception of Maori parliamentarians. The bulk of 
politicians simply conformed to the idea of remaining 
aloof from sporting affairs. 
Throughout the racial controversy of the 1928 and 
1949 All Black tours, New Zealand dissent remained within 
so-called 'respectable' avenues of protest. It was 
manifested often through press releases from eminent 
individuals and organisations, along with numerous 
letters to newspaper editors. The level of dissent did 
not reach the point of petitions or street marches. Ten 
years would elapse before opposition, in the form of 
public 'direct action' protests and a nationwide 
petition, would emerge against the 1960 'all white' All 
Black team to South Africa. 
The status of Maori rugby players within the context 
of New Zealand and South African sporting links 
underlined the hollowness of New Zealand platitudes 
celebrating racial inclusion. Nonetheless, public dissent 
over the negation of Maori sporting rights took place 
within a wider political context of imperial loyalty. New 
Zealand and South African rugby contacts were seen by 
middle class New Zealand commentators (conservative 
politicians, press editors and sports officials) from an 
Anglocentric perspective. According to civic speeches, 
press releases and editorials, such contacts consolidated 
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links between countries with a common British heritage. 
New Zealand and South African rugby representatives were 
commonly portrayed as imperial ambassadors, or 
'missionaries'. Realistically, All Black and Springbok 
rugby matches merely enacted an intense sporting rivalry. 
The individual players, furthermore, were not the 
ambassadors of Empire, but merely the cream of New 
Zealand and South African rugby. 
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, 
the lion's share of imperialist investment in New Zealand 
and South African rugby relations was from New Zealand. 
It often displayed greater imperial loyalty than South 
Africa, especially within the sphere of British Empire 
politics. The 1926 Balfour Declaration recognised 
equality between Britain and the dominions, yet was 
'deplored' by New Zealand political leaders. Furthermore, 
the Balfour Declaration's legislative equivalent, the 
1931 Statute of Westminster, was not adopted by New 
Zealand until 194 7. On the other hand, the Balfour 
Declaration and statute of Westminster satisfied 
concurrent Afrikaner nationalist demands for South 
African political parity with Britain. 
south African aversion to the imperialist character 
of rugby tours reflected traditional Afrikaner antipathy 
to the British Empire. Its enthusiasm for the Balfour 
Declaration and Statute of Westminster was linked clearly 
with the Hertzog Nationalist Government. Coinciding with 
the 1949 All Black tour, South Africa was governed by the 
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overtly pro-republican National Party. While the majority 
of SARB administrators were Anglos, they usually viewed 
rugby exchanges between the two countries as sporting 
events with internationalist overtones. Hence, South 
African sporting commentators utilised cliches such as 
the development of 'mutual friendships' between players 
and countries alike, during the 1928 and 1949 All Black 
tours. 
Whereas New Zealand demonstrated a greater sense of 
identification with Empire than South Africa, imperialist 
sentiments were not universally held. New Zealand working 
class publications (such as the Standard) appeared 
reluctant to place New Zealand and South African rugby 
contacts within an imperialist framework. The majority of 
rugby supporters, moreover, viewed such events as merely 
sporting occasions without wider political meaning. 
The zenith of imperialist investment in New Zealand 
and South African rugby relations was unquestionably the 
1921 Springbok tour of New Zealand. It was the first 
sporting event for New Zealand and South Africa following 
the Great War. The Springbok players were eulogized to 
the extent that they were likened to royalty, instead of 
recognised simply as elite sportsmen. Imperial slogans 
were less evident during the 1928 All Black tour of South 
Africa. Sporting officialdom and conservative politicians 
spoke of the teams' upholding of 'Dominion honour' . 
Unlike the 1921 Springboks, the All Blacks were not 
likened to royalty, but were simply 'ambassadors'. 
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The social and political rhetoric of New Zealand 
commentators was often internationalist during the 1937 
Springbok and 1949 All Black tours. Politically, New 
Zealand, through the first Labour Government, displayed 
greater independence in its external policy. On 
occasions, it disagreed with Britain on issues within the 
League of Nations. The British Empire Games, furthermore, 
had replaced rugby and cricket as the leading imperial 
sporting occasion. The Empire Games involved a greater 
number of competing nations, whereas rugby and cricket 
tours were initially confined to Britain, New Zealand, 
South Africa and Australia. The British Empire received 
little coverage during the 1937 tour, and rugby issues 
dominated the sporting press. On occasions, sporting 
commentators reverted to internationalist slogans such as 
'mutual understanding and friendships' to depict the 
social outcome of the 1937 tour. Both imperialism and 
internationalism generated little comment from sporting 
commentators during the 1949 All Black tour of South 
Africa, as the denial of Maori sporting rights was the 
foremost question discussed. 
An examination of rugby contacts between New Zealand 
and South Africa to 1950 reveals that the cliche 
'politics and sport do not mix' is ultimately illusive. 
Social and political issues are unquestionably entwined 
with international sporting events. Within the context of 
pre-1950 New Zealand and south African rugby exchanges, 
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race relations and imperialism were the dominant themes. 
Imperialism, however, declined as a key issue with the 
passing of each rugby tour. Imperial political relations 
between Britain and the Dominions (including New Zealand 
and south Africa) became increasingly informal throughout 
the inter-war years. Furthermore, the British Empire 
Games had become the pre-eminent device of the sporting 
Empire. Consequently, the press coverage of All Black and 
Springbok tours became strictly rugby-oriented without 
wider imperialist or internationalist connotations. 
Race overtook imperialism as the dominant social and 
political question which underlined New Zealand and South 
African rugby contacts. Yet, it was defined narrowly to 
the negation of Maori sporting rights in relation to All 
Black teams to South Africa. Initially, few New 
Zealanders opposed the NZRFU's betrayl of the 
inclusionist tradition of New Zealand sport and society. 
By 1950, trade unions and war veterans' organisations, 
and many individual New Zealanders, opposed Maori 
exclusion from All Black teams to South Africa. However, 
the majority of New Zealand rugby followers failed to 
view Maori exclusion as a moral issue. 
The negation of sporting and social rights for black 
South Africans was generally overlooked by those who 
demanded equal sporting rights for Maori and Pakeha. 
Discussion over the unequal status of black South 
Africans surfaced rarely during New Zealand and South 
African rugby tours before 1950. When it did, it was 
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inevitably within a social darwinist framework of the 
relative status of black South Africans, Maori, and 
Pakeha. Maori, on occasions, were described by social 
commentators as racially superior to black South 
Africans. Thus, South African suggestions of parity 
between the two were met with hostility from New 
Zealanders. Social darwinism, nonetheless, was prevalent 
among the Western world until the end of World War Two. 
European imperial powers governed the vast majority of 
African, Indian and South East Asian people of darker 
skin colour. Black Americans and South Africans were 
subjected to legal and social discrimination within the 
United States and South Africa respectively. Indeed, 
Maori suffered continued land appropriation and received 
lower state expenditure than Pakeha, despite the 
inclusionist rhetoric of New Zealand political 
commentators. 
The social basis of rugby contacts between New 
Zealand and South Africa remained one of racial elitism 
following World War Two, despite the wartime discrediting 
of social darwinist ideas. South Africa, unlike the 
majority of Western nations, intensified white racial 
domination into apartheid. Maori rugby players, unlike 
their military peers, remained excluded from South 
Africa. Throughout the late twentieth century, South 
Africa became an international sporting, cultural, 
political and economic pariah. New Zealand rugby 
administrators, however, continued to pursue rugby 
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contacts with South Africa, at any cost. Public protests 
against Maori exclusion (and the 1960 Sharpeville 
massacre) failed to convince the NZRFU to cancel the 1960 
All Black tour of South Africa. 
Racial issues surrounding post-1960 New Zealand and 
South African rugby tours transcended Maori sporting 
rights, and centred on the denial of black South African 
sporting, social and political rights. Consequently, the 
inclusion of several players of Maori and Samoan lineage 
(as 'honorary whites') on the 1970 All Black tour of 
South Africa was overshadowed by apartheid. Local and 
international pressure contributed to the cancellation of 
the 1973 Springbok tour of New Zealand. Direct-action 
protests against the 1971 Springbok tour of Australia 
displayed the possible disturbances created by a similar 
tour of New Zealand. Furthermore, the 1974 Commonwealth 
Games (held at Christchurch) would be threatened by an 
African, Asian and West Indian sporting boycott if the 
1973 tour proceeded. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, New Zealand society 
was divided on the question of sporting contacts with 
South Africa. Notwithstanding the 'sport and politics do 
not mix' banality, New Zealand and South African rugby 
contacts was a political tool for the National Party in 
its election victories of 1975 and 1981. National 
appealed to rugby followers, especially among its 
constituency of social conservatives, by allowing the 
1976 All Black and 1981 Springbok tours to proceed. The 
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1981 tour demonstrated conclusively the wisdom of the 
1973 Springbok tour's cancellation. New Zealand society 
was divided evenly along 'pro' and 'anti' tour lines. The 
lasting memory of 1981 was one of barbed wire, police 
batons and social polarisation, instead of rugby. New 
Zealand joined the rest of the world (albeit belatedly) 
in a sporting, cultural and economic boycott of South 
Africa, which continued until the post-1990 dismantling 
of apartheid. 
As at 1996, New Zealand enjoys full sporting 
contacts with a democratic and 'non-racial' South Africa. 
The All Blacks' best team, irrespective of 'colour', 
plays a Springbok team which represents the non-racial 
South African Rugby Football Union (SARFU). While South 
African rugby remains dominated by whites, the current 
'star' of Springbok rugby is the black winger, Chester 
Williams. Furthermore, over 50% of the current All Black 
team are of Maori and Pacific Island lineage. 
Nevertheless, the current scenario of discrimination-free 
rugby between New Zealand and South Africa took over 
seventy years to accomplish. 
The exclusion of Maori rugby players from past All 
Black tours of South Africa raises the question of the 
status of Maori within New Zealand society. The 1840 
Treaty of Waitangi proposed equal citizenship for Maori 
and Pakeha. While the inclusionist ethos was considered 
by many as a national principle, it produced social 
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complacency and, at times, hostility. Furthermore, it 
remained vacuous without widespread evidence of tangible 
social and economic parity between Maori and Pakeha. 
Within New Zealand sport and society, the NZRFU 
consistently displayed scant regard to the inclusionist 
ethos of New Zealand society. Its negation of Maori 
sporting rights (and the idea of racial inclusion) to 
develop a sporting rivalry between New Zealand and South 
Africa may well be viewed as 'paternalist' from an early 
twentieth century perspective. However, within a 
contemporary social and political context, Maori 
exclusion from rugby football tours of South Africa was 
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